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5Abstract
This thesis presents a mathematical formulation of informational inhomogeneity in finan-
cial markets, with emphasis on its impact on asset volatility, the notion of information
extraction, and the role of information providers. We begin with a brief review of the BHM
framework, which models the market filtration by an information process consisting of a
signal and a noise term, such that the signal-to-noise ratio is determined by the informa-
tion flow rate. Motivated by the observations that valuable information is rarely circulated
homogeneously across financial markets, and that the information flow rate is typically
random, we introduce, in the first part of the thesis, an extension of the BHM approach
that leads to the simplest class of stochastic volatility models. In this extended framework
we derive closed form expressions: for (a) asset price processes; (b) pricing formulae for
options; and (c) option deltas. We show that the model can be calibrated to fit volatility
surfaces reasonably well, and that it can be used effectively to model information manip-
ulation. In the second part we introduce a framework for the valuation of information. In
particular, a new formulation of the utility-indifference argument is introduced and used as
a basis for pricing. We regard information as a quantity that converts a prior distributions
into a posterior distributions. The amount of information can thus be quantified by relative
entropy. The key to our theory is to equate the maximised a posterior utility with the a
posterior expectation of the utility of the a priori optimal strategy. This formulation leads
to one price for a given quantity of upside, and another for a given quantity of downside
information. Various intuitive, as well as counterintuitive implications (for example, price
of information is not necessarily an increasing function of the volume of information) of
our theory are discussed in detail.
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Introduction
Asset pricing with random information flow
Various aspects of the role of information in asset pricing have been studied extensively in
the literature (e.g., asymmetric information, filtration enlargement) for at least half a cen-
tury [1, 27, 28, 31, 50, 52]. The value of an asset is based on the expectation of its future
returns—whether investing in the asset will bring the desired returns. Such an expectation
is determined by the available information gathered up to the time at which the valuation
is made. However, it is rarely the case one would actually be able to obtain the full infor-
mation that is in principle available in the market: it is more usually the case that different
investors receive different amounts of information, and this in turn contributes in a signif-
icant way to market volatility. Indeed, it is reasonable to take the view that the problems
associated with modelling (a) information inhomogeneity, and (b) volatility structure are
very closely related. To understand the volatility structure in the market, we need to take a
step back from traditional asset pricing or volatility modelling, and take as a fresh starting
point the modelling of information.
In classical asset pricing models, the normal point of embarkation is usually the specifi-
cation of a model for the price process of an asset, which is typically defined on a pre-
scribed probability space equipped with the augmented filtration generated by a (multi-
dimensional) Brownian motion to which the price process is taken to be adapted. The
consideration of such a Brownian filtration sometimes give rise to the question whether
the Brownian motion really contains any useful information—is it not just noise, after all?
Indeed, we often speak of an asset price as being “driven” by noise. So it seems para-
doxical that asset price movements can be “informative” on the one hand, and yet merely
driven by “noise” on the other. In light of this, it would be more intuitive to begin the
modelling of asset price processes and associated derivative prices by explicitly modelling
the filtration—that is to say, by the modelling of information.
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One promising way forward to this end has been provided in the framework developed
by Brody, Hughston and Macrina [17] (hereafter denoted BHM) in several works and in
collaborations with various co-authors. The idea of the BHM framework is that the price
process of an asset is viewed as the output of a series of factors brought into play by the
market, rather than an input. The filtration available to a financial market is an important
ingredient, indeed a key ingredient, for price formation—a point that tends to be neglected
in mainstream asset pricing. Movements of prices are, to a large extent, due to changes in
either (i) the “pricing kernel”, or (ii) the information available to the market. The former
means in essence that the representative investor has changed his attitude to risk and his
level of impatience, and hence is adjusting his position to accommodate these changes in
“preferences”. The second source of price movement is due to information update in the
market: when new information becomes available, price movements reflect the changes
in investor expectations of the returns or cash flows likely to be offered by the securities
under consideration. Anderson et al. [4] used high-frequency data to show that news is
one of the driving factors of price dynamics, and makes a contribution to conditional mean
jumps. More recently, Bollen et al. [8] reported that the sentiment analysis of Twitter
texts can be used to predict future movements of stock indices. Independently, Brody et
al. [12] demonstrated a similar predictability feature of the financial market using internet
blog data. All these researches provide evidence by empirical research that there exists an
information inhomogeneity in the financial market.
The BHM framework adopts mathematical ideas in a fundamentally novel way from the
general theory of the filtering of random systems (see, e.g., Kallianpur [36] and Wonham
[56]). According to the BHM methodology, the price process of an asset that delivers a
single cash flow at some specified terminal date is driven by the dynamics of the conditional
(a posterior) probability of the terminal cash flow, given the information in the filtration up
to that time. The price process of an asset is derived with the specification of an information
process that generates the filtration of the probability space. The information process aims
to take into account the two sources affecting price movements: the signal concerning the
asset return, and the associated noise that obscures the signal. The price is then given
by the discounted risk-adjusted expectation of the cash flow, conditional on the available
information.
In the BHMmodel, one needs to specify the information flow rate parameter that describes
the rate of revelation of information across the market. However, measuring the information
flow in the market is somehow a very difficult task—in part because information can be
rather intangible—and there also exists the problem of information inhomogeneity, where
part of the market may not be able to absorb certain news as quickly as some other parts of
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the market are able to. These problems lead eventually to the suggestion that a very natural
improvement or extension of the BHM framework would be to admit within the modeling
framework the possibility of a random information flow rate.
We shall in what follows discuss in detail the analysis of such random information flow
rate models, and derive the relevant conditional probability necessary for asset pricing. The
dynamics of the bond price process thus obtained will be shown to be consistent with the
BHMmodel in the sense that the random information flowmodel reduces to the BHM if the
distribution of the information flow random variable collapses to a point. An information-
theoretic analysis will be presented in some detail to highlight the learning rate of infor-
mation under the auspices of such a model. The model for the risky asset, resulting from
the use of random information flow rate, can in fact be viewed as a BHM-mixture model,
in a way analogous to the log-normal mixture models sometimes used as extensions of the
Black-Scholes model. Here, however, the mixture arises as a consequence; not as a model
postulate. We are thus able to identify an information-theoretic justification for such mix-
ture models that are otherwise introduced in the literature often on an ad hoc basis [9, 43].
Perhaps one of the most interesting phenomena arising from the random information flow
model concerns the volatility process. With an uncertain information flow rate, the bond
volatility process begins lower and ends higher, when compared to the corresponding sit-
uation in the original BHM model. Economically, this can be explained by the suggestion
that since information flows are uncertain the result is a reduction in the willingness of
market participants to engage in market activity. As more information is revealed towards
maturity, the bond volatility is maintained because there is still activity due to uncertain but
nontrivial potential profitable opportunities.
The information flow parameter in this sense controls the volatility of the bond process. A
major consequence of the random information flowmodel is that it allows for the possibility
of modelling stochastic volatility in option pricing. We shall work out the pricing of an
option on a credit-risky bond, under the random information model, where the solution is
no more complicated computationally than the Black-Scholes option pricing formula. We
shall show by calibrating the BHM model to the random information flow model that we
can produce a volatility surface as observed in option markets. This approach allows for
the pricing, from an intuitive setting in an information-driven context, of derivatives that
are explicitly sensitive to future volatility levels.
The method proposed here for modelling information flows to derive the stochasticity of
volatility offers possible solutions to many of the existing problems in traditional stochastic
volatility modelling as in Heston [32], Hull et al. [33], Stein et al. [51] as well as many
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others. Ja¨ckel [34] has provided a concise summary of some such models. The problem of
these models is that the structure of the volatility is typically modelled in a rather ad hoc
manner, and is somehow not very obvious to justify. For example, in order to calibrate the
Heston model, one would need the mean reverting rate and the volatility of the volatility
(vol-of-vol) to be extremely low. The set of calibrated parameters are often hard to interpret
economically, and perhaps this is why the choice of a model is often largely dependent on
the ease with which it can be calibrated to market data, rather than the degree to which it
fits the structure of the contract.
Finally, the investigation of the random information flow model leads to the concept of
“price manipulation” by an act carried out by some market agent (e.g., an institution) capa-
ble of manipulating the information flow rate. This idea of information disparity is further
quantified in the section of the thesis on information pricing.
Information cost and measurement
Under an uncertain information flow one can nevertheless find fair prices for securities.
However, due to these uncertainties regarding the final outcome, the conditional volatility
process becomes very different and there exists the possibility of information manipulation.
Disparity of information alone can affect the expectation of the assets, and hence the present
value. Therefore, there will be a general desire among market participants to acquire more
information, even at a cost. If one were able to obtain extra information to obtain a better
expectation of the future return of an asset, then it seems reasonable (perhaps through
the adaptation of some generalised principle of the absence of arbitrage) that the required
piece of information should be fairly priced. In a sense, information can be regarded as a
“perishable” asset that can be bought or sold while still “fresh”.
The fact that information can be regarded as tradable object has been envisaged by Gleick
[25], in which the basic unit of information, the bit, is used to represent atoms for con-
structing an amount of information. In our view, information acts like a kind of commodity
that can be consumed or traded, but will perish rather quickly, like bread or fish, and must
be used before its “best-by date”, or discarded.
The first question we may ask is: what is the cost for a piece of information? This turns
out to be a nontrivial problem. Indeed, before one can meaningfully ask this question,
the definition of information needs to be understood in the first place. For any piece of
information, it could at least in principle have almost any possible effect on the stock price:
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it could be inside information, the revelation of which would alter the stock price; or it
could be based on some comprehensive historical analysis of the market, which has no
direct connection to any changes to the company under consideration; or it could be pure
speculation or “gossip” made up by essentially random sources.
The problem of distinguishing reliable knowledge from rumour—or equivalently to dis-
tinguish information from noise—has been a subject of study for many years. In a paper
by Hayek [31] the author discusses the importance to society of knowledge about specific
tasks, and that there should exist a price system to filter out the irrelevant parts, such that the
right skill set is accordingly valued more highly. However, unless we know the “bottom-
line” result, it is difficult to tell which piece of information is actually valuable. Sometimes
only time can tell the truth.
As in the BHM framework, we consider a piece of information to consist of two parts,
namely, (i) a signal term and (ii) a noise term. As will be shown in chapter 2, the signal-
to-noise ratio plays a significant role in determining the quality of the information. This
parameter describes the information flow in the market: nonetheless, it also drives the
volatility of the price process. It is shown in chapter 2 that if one uses a manipulated
signal-to-noise ratio, the derived price process can move in a direction completely opposite
to the process with a true signal-to-noise ratio. In this case we consider the information to
be unreliable. For simplicity, we assume that the information on hand is reliable.
Therefore, all information is useful but with different degrees of usefulness. This is con-
sistent with the idea of the price system in Hayek [31]. The notion of usefulness crucially
depends on whether it changes one’s prior belief, and to what extent one can leverage on
it. For the former, an investor is willing to pay for a piece of information that is not already
held by the general public. It is the change of a stock price in adjusting to this informa-
tion that creates profit opportunities. Such “surprises” can be quantified using information
measures such as the relative entropy. A cost function can then be associated to each new
bit of information, for downside and upside. This is shown in chapter 4.
We consider information as an asset that is nonreplicable. Hence for its pricing we propose
to adopt the method of utility indifference. The idea is that the informational cost should
balance out the profit gained for having this extra information, otherwise the market will
fall into disequilibrium. We show that using the utility indifference pricing formula pro-
posed by Grossman and Stiglitz [28] can lead to a form of arbitrage in the sense that with a
modest cost for the information an investor can gain, in extreme cases, unbounded upside
return. The key shortcoming of the celebrated work of Grossman and Stiglitz [28] is that
the cost for information is independent of the quality of information. We introduce an aug-
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mented utility indifference price such that it depends on the quality, i.e. opportunities it may
provide, of information being released, and one that is free of arbitrage in the sense that a
piece of information that offers unbounded benefit, according to our theory, costs infinity.
In fact, this statement is made more precise in Appendix A to show the existence of a mar-
tingale family. It is also worth noting that our utility indifference information prices have
different characteristics for upside and downside information, and we shall demonstrate the
sensitivity of the prices to changes with respect to various model parameters.
The layout of the thesis will be as follows. In chapter 1 we review the basic background
material of the information-based asset pricing framework that is presented in Brody et
al. [15, 17]. In chapter 2, we introduce the notion of a random information flow rate,
and discuss the necessary conditions for this modelling setup to be economically viable.
We derive the bond pricing formula and its dynamics, drawing attention to the volatility
process and the information-learning rate. In chapter 3, the option pricing formula and the
associated option delta that determines the sensitivity are worked out in detail. The use of
the random information flow can be viewed as the simplest stochastic-volatility extension
of the BHMmodel, leading to a better-fitted implied volatility surface. Unlike conventional
stochastic volatility models, where the stochasticity is introduced typically in an ad hoc
manner, we are able to justify our approach from empirical facts concerning the lack of
knowledge of the flow rate parameter.
In the second half of the thesis, we present the main argument for the theory of information
pricing, and demonstrate how the theory works by means of simple examples. Specifically,
in Section 4.4 we propose a new pricing formula for information, such that the price is
dependent on the quality of information being offered. Of course, from the viewpoint of
information provider, it is not possible to guarantee the quality of information; our pricing
formula thus can be understood as providing a pre-agreement between information provider
and information receiver. Various intuitive, as well as counterintuitive observations (for
example, price of information is not necessarily an increasing function of the volume of
information) that follow from our theory are discussed in detail in chapter 4 by means of
simple examples. In particular, we consider the behaviour of the cost structure associated
with various different degrees of market constraints regarding the possibility of short selling
(for example, if short selling is strictly forbidden, then one can avoid loss from information
concerning a “downside” price move, but cannot make profit out of this; whereas if short
selling is allowed, the situation is quite different). Finally, in Section 4.10 we discuss briefly
our theory to the continuous-time setup by extending the work of Amendinger et al. [3] (for
reference purposes their framework is reviewed in Appendix B).
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Chapter 1
Information-Based Asset Pricing
The purpose of this chapter is to review the information-based asset pricing framework
developed by Brody, Hughston, and Macrina [11, 13, 15, 17, 42] (BHM), which consti-
tutes the background of the most of the material in the first part of this thesis. The BHM
framework was initially developed in the context of providing a solution to the pricing and
hedging of credit risky assets, where the focus was placed on calculating the conditional
expectation of a future cash flow taking various possible states. However, the framework
naturally found applications in asset classes well beyond credit-risky instruments, reaching
areas such as equity assets, commodities, reinsurance, statistical arbitrage, and stochastic
volatility modelling. The BHM framework is perhaps unconventional in that the stochastic
process describing the asset dynamics is derived, rather than imposed, from more primitive
underlying concepts, namely, the modelling of the actual cash flows and the associated flow
of information. This is in sharp contrast with the more traditional approach following the
seminal work of Black and Scholes [7], but nevertheless is fully consistent with the by now
familiar arbitrage-free pricing theory, as presented in [6, 19, 29, 30, 49].
1.1 Market filtration
We consider financial markets with the specification of a filtered probability space denoted
by (Ω,F , {Ft}0≤t≤T<∞,Q), where Q denotes the risk-neutral measure and the filtration
{Ft} is understood to be the market filtration. The market is not assumed to be complete,
the absence of arbitrage and the existence of an established pricing kernel imply the ex-
istence of a unique risk-neutral measure. We further assume that the interest rate system
is deterministic, and let {PtT}0≤t≤T<∞ denote the discount function at time t. That the
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interest rate system is deterministic implies that the discount function can be expressed in
terms of a ratio of initial discount functions:
PtT =
P0T
P0t
.
The discount function system is assumed to be differentiable in T and strictly decreasing,
and to satisfy the conditions 0 < P0t ≤ 1 and limt→∞ P0t = 0. Under these assumptions, it
follows that if an integrable random variable XT represents the cash flow associated with
an asset paid at time T , then the value of the asset at time t is given by:
BtT = PtTE[XT | Ft]. (1.1)
Since XT represents the value of the future cash flow, market participants do not have
direct access to its value before time T . In other words, XT is only FT - measurable. For
simplicity, let us assume that the random variable XT takes discrete values {x1, ∙ ∙ ∙ , xn}
with a priori probabilities {p1, ∙ ∙ ∙ , pn}.
Information available to market participants up to time t can be modelled by an information
process. The information process has the property such that maximum information in a
suitably defined sense is only revealed at time T ; otherwise we have a noisy signal. In
particular, let us consider an {Ft}-adapted market information process of the form:
ξt = σXT t + βtT , (1.2)
where the process {βtT}0≤t≤T is a standard Brownian bridge on the interval [0, T ] inde-
pendent of XT , and σ is the information revealing rate parameter, which is assumed to be
deterministic.
The Brownian bridge {βtT} is a Gaussian process satisfying β0T = βTT = 0 with mean
E[βtT ] = 0 ,
and covariance
E[βsT βtT ] =
s(T − t)
T
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . The Brownian bridge represents the “noise” over the time interval
[0, T ], since it is assumed to be independent of the “signal” term XT . An intuitive way of
understanding noise is to think of it as representing rumours, speculations, and misinfor-
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mation. Naturally there are many such noises circulating in financial markets affecting the
price dynamics in a random manner. The idea here is to use the Gaussian process {βtT} to
model the aggregate of these different noise contributions.
The construction of the information process implies that information regarding the future
cash flow is gradually revealed from zero, and reach a maximum at the terminal time when
the value of XT is revealed. This idea can be illustrated more explicitly by the consid-
eration of the mutual information between XT and ξt, that is, the amount of information
contained in ξt about the value of XT , which monotonically increases in time and reaches
its maximum at T . The role of the information flow rate parameter σ then becomes more
apparent in that the growth rate of the mutual information (the “learning curve”) increases
as σ increases. More details on the analysis of mutual information will be presented in the
next chapter.
We assume that the market filtration {Ft} is generated by the market information process:
Ft = σ({ξs}0≤s≤t). The cash flow XT is not Ft measurable for t < T . The bridge process
{βtT} is not adapted to {Ft} and thus is not directly accessible to market participants. This
reflects the fact that until the cash flow is paid, the market participants cannot distinguish
signal from noise in the market.
1.2 Asset information and price formation
It can be shown that the information process in this setting is a Markov process [17], hence
the problem of bond-price valuation in (1.1) is reduced to determining
BtT = PtTE[XT | ξt].
An alternative way to express the above equality is to write
BtT = PtT
n∑
i=1
xiπit(xi|ξt),
where
πit = Q(XT = xi | ξt)
is the conditional probability of XT given the information ξt.
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Using the Bayes formula we deduce that
πit =
piρ(ξt|XT = xi)∑
j pjρ(ξt|XT = xj)
.
Here, the conditional density of ξt can be deduced from the relation
Q(ξt < σXT t + βtT |XT ) = Q(βtT < ξt − σXT t|XT ).
Recall that conditional on XT = xi, ξt is a Gaussian random variable with mean σxit and
variance t(T − t)/T . Hence we have
ρ(ξt|XT = xi) = 1√
2πt(T − t)/T exp
(
−1
2
(ξt − σxit)2
t(T − t)/T
)
.
It follows that the bond price in the original BHM model takes the form
BtT = PtT
∑
i xipi exp[
T
T−t(σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t)]∑
i pi exp[
T
T−t(σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t)]
.
Remark: The bond price is derived through the specification of the information process
and an application of the Bayes theorem. One can think of the bond price as the noisy a
posterior expectation of the future cash flow, suitably discounted.
1.3 Price dynamics
The behaviour of the asset price can be studied by working out the stochastic dynamics of
the conditional probability
πit =
pi exp[
T
T−t(σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t)]∑
i pi exp[
T
T−t(σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t)]
.
This can be achieved by an application of Ito’s lemma. Writing XtT = E[XT | ξt] for the
conditional expectation, we have the dynamic of πit as
dπit =
σT
T − t(xi −XtT )πitdWt, (1.3)
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where the process {Wt}0≤t≤T defined by
Wt = ξt +
∫ t
0
ξs
T − sds− σT
∫ t
0
XsT
T − sds (1.4)
is an {Ft}-Brownian motion. The fact that the innovation process {Wt} is a Brownian
motion can be verified by showing that E[Wu|Ft] = Wt for 0 ≤ t ≤ u ≤ T and that
(dWt)2 = dt, hence by virtue of Le´vy’s criterion {Wt} is a Brownian motion.
An alternative perspective of the problem is to view this as a nonlinear filtering problem,
with the solution given by the Fujisaki-Kallianpur-Kunita (FKK) theory (see [23, 49] ).
Under the filtering setting, given a probability space and a background filtration {Gt}, we
consider an observation process of the form
ξt =
∫ t
0
μsds + Yt, (1.5)
and an unobservable process
zt = z0 +
∫ t
0
φsds + Mt, (1.6)
where {Yt} is a Brownian motion and {Mt} a Gt-martingale. All the processes {μt}, {Yt}, {φt}
and {Mt} in equations (1.5) and (1.6) are assumed to be adapted to the filtration {Gt}. The
problem is to estimate zt given the observation {ξt}. The knowledge for the estimation
comes from the observation of {ξt}, hence generating the filtration {Ft}. Denote an esti-
mate by
zˆt = E[zt|Ft].
The basic result of nonlinear filtering theory states that the dynamics of the estimate is of
the following form
dzˆt = φˆt + [(μ̂z)t − μˆtzˆt]dWt, (1.7)
where the innovation process
Wt = ξt −
∫ t
0
μˆsds (1.8)
is an {Ft}-Brownian Motion.
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To use the result above, we can rewrite ξt by considering the stochastic differential form of
the Brownian bridge
dβtT = − βtT
T − tdt + dYt
for 0 ≤ t < T , where {Yt} a standard Brownian motion. And take note of the fact that
ξt = σXT t + βtT :
dξt =
σXT T − ξt
T − t dt + dYt.
Comparing this to equation (1.5) we deduce that
μt =
σXT T − ξt
T − t .
The estimate of this process is therefore
μˆt =
σXtT T − ξt
T − t ,
where XtT = E[XT |Ft]. Substituting the above expression for μˆt into equation (1.8), we
obtain equation (1.4). For the dynamics of {πit}, we consider the case when our unobserv-
able process takes the form
zt = 1{XT = xi},
where 1{∙} denotes the indicator function. It follows that
zˆt = E[1{XT = xi}|Ft]
= Q(XT = xi|Ft),
which by definition is just πit. Hence
(μ̂z)t =
σxiT − ξt
T − t πit.
Substituting this, zˆt and μˆt into equation (1.7), we get equation (1.3). This also allows us
to deduce that {Wt}, represented by equation (1.4), is an Ft-Brownian motion.
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Finally, we can write down the discount bond dynamics
dBtT = rtBtT dt + ΣtT dWt,
where the short rate takes the form
rt = −∂ ln P0t
∂t
,
and the absolute bond volatility ΣtT is given by
ΣtT =
σT
T − tPtT VtT ,
where the conditional variance of XT is defined as
VtT =
n∑
i=1
(xi − E[XT |ξt])2 πit,
in which we see that the information flow rate parameter σ controls the overall magnitude
of the absolute volatility. The important result is that the bond price process is derived from
the information process together with the specification of the cash flow XT . Information
from the market is somehow filtered into knowledge of the price dynamics. This is intuitive,
as any price movement is closely related to updates of market information. Anderson et al.
[4] has demonstrated, for instance, with high frequency historical data, macroeconomic
news is a driving factor of the price dynamics, and has direct contributions to conditional
mean jumps.
Conversely, one can extract the information status from the price process. In terms of
filtrations, the information contained in {ξt} is equivalent to that in {BtT}, i.e.
σ({ξs}0≤s≤t) = σ({BsT}0≤s≤t).
This follows from the fact that if we define B(t, ξ) such that BtT = B(t, ξt). Then
∂B(t, ξ)
∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
ξ=ξt
=
σT
T − t
∑
i pi[xi − BtT /PtT ]2 exp
[
T
T−t(σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t)
]∑
i pi exp
[
T
T−t(σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t)
]
is a positive quantity. Therefore, B(t, ξt) is monotonically increasing in ξt, and hence
invertible. Economically, this means that the observed price or volatility has already incor-
porated the structure of news, uncertainty and expectation of the future cash flow.
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1.4 Securities and derivative pricing
This simple setting already allows us to price a range of different products including options
on bonds, barrier options, credit default swaps, and basket of credit risky bonds, and so on.
The price of a vanilla European option, in particular, can be derived in closed form, and
the structure is similar to that of the Black-Scholes. To sketch the procedure for pricing a
European option on a credit-risky bond that matures at time T , with exercise date t < T ,
one considers the price of an option with the payoff (BtT −K)+ at time t:
C0 = P0tE[(BtT −K)+],
where BtT is the bond price at the date the option matures, and K is the strike price. This
equality can be rewritten in terms of the conditional probability πit as follows
C0 = P0tE
[(∑
i
PtT πitxi −K
)+]
. (1.9)
For simplicity of notation, we denote the numerator of the conditional probability πit by
pit = pi exp
[
T
T − t
(
xiσξt − 1
2
x2i σ
2t
)]
.
Consequently we have the following:
πit =
pit
Φt
where Φt =
∑
i
pit.
Hence equation (1.9) can be rewritten as:
C0 = P0tE
[
1
Φt
(∑
i
(PtT xi −K)pit
)+]
.
The term Φ−1t is shown to be a Q-martingale in [17] and can be used to effect a change of
measure. The call option price is therefore given by
C0 = P0tEBT
[(
n∑
i=0
(PtT xi −K) pit
)+]
,
where pit is the unnormalised conditional probability of XT given ξt and BT denotes the
bridge measure. Essentially, the density of this bridge measure is the normalising factor of
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the conditional expectation, and ξt is a BT-Gaussian random variable.
If we consider a digital bond for simplicity, so that XT takes the values {x0, x1} with
probabilities {p0, p1}, respectively, the initial price of a call option becomes
C0 = P0tEBT
[
((PtT x0 −K) p0t + (PtT x1 −K) p1t)+
]
.
Depending on the values of PtT xi the option can expire in-the-money or out-of-the-money
for certain. The only nontrivial case is when PtT x1 ≥ K ≥ PtT x0, where the option can
expire either in or out-of-the-money, depending on whether ξt > ξ∗, where ξ∗ is the unique
critical value of ξt such that BtT = K. In this case, we can compute the expectation ex-
plicitly, since ξt is a BT-Gaussian random variable. By performing the Gaussian integration
explicitly, we arrive at the BHM option pricing formula
C0 = P0t
n∑
i=0
(PtT xi −K)N(σxi
√
τ − Zˉ),
where N(a) is the Gaussian cumulative distribution function up to a, τ = tT/(T − t) and
Z = ξ∗t /
√
t(T − t)/T . The final result is no more complicated computationally than the
Black-Scholes option formula.
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Chapter 2
Stochastic Information Revealing Rate
The purpose of this section is to develop a model that extends the original BHM model re-
viewed in chapter 1 such that the volatility parameter is assumed stochastic. We shall begin
by arguing the economic rationale of considering such an extension, which is augmented
by a sensitivity analysis of the original BHM model on the volatility parameter. We then
derive the bond pricing formula in the stochastic volatility setup, and investigate in some
detail the dynamical behaviour of the price process both analytically and numerically.
2.1 Motivation
The fact that it is market information that affects price dynamics has been emphasised by
many authors [2, 20, 40, 52], and has also been demonstrated against market data (e.g.,
[4, 8, 12]). The aim of the BHM approach is to bring the mathematical abstraction of
financial modelling at the level of the specification of market filtration, i.e. the flow of
information. In this way, price process can be derived as an emergent phenomenon, rather
than postulated from the outset, as we have illustrated in the previous chapter.
One of the simplifying assumptions in the original BHMmodel (1.2) and the various gener-
alisations of it that have appeared in the literature [16, 42] is that the information flow-rate
parameter σ is taken to be F0-measurable. In a more realistic setup, however, market par-
ticipants have little knowledge about the value of σ. In fact, in most cases the information
flow rate is not measurable even after the value ofXT is revealed. The main issue addressed
in this and the next chapter is therefore to extend the original BHM model to allow for σ
to be a random variable. Such an extension constitutes the simplest stochastic volatility
model within the BHM framework, which is shown in the next chapter to give sufficient
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flexibility to calibrate volatility surfaces.
The information revealing rate reflects the learning rate of the terminal value of the bond.
In other word, it is the growth rate of the filtration, or the information set, as time passes.
It is possible that the growth rate is not measurable, and we only have a range of uncertain
values. This parameter σ is in fact fairly difficult to determine—at which rate market
participants “learn” is not straightforward to measure. Hence it is reasonable to assume
that σ is not measurable for any t < T , and possibly even when t = T . We begin our
random information/signal model with σ being a random variable that is fixed at the initial
time. This is equivalent to having a range of “guesses” for σ = {σk}1≤k≤m, each with
a probability assigned. The price process is thus expected to behave like a mixture of the
constant σ model—the BHMmixture model. This has a certain similarity to the log-normal
mixture models, in particular, the uncertain-volatility model in Mercurio et al. [43]. Our
approach of having a fixed random variable σ is the first step towards addressing stochastic
volatility in the information-based pricing framework. It is aimed to tackle the essence of
the problem, and provide a tractable model for the asset price.
As shown in chapter 1, the rate at which information is revealed in the market determines
the magnitude of the volatility. Thus σ can be viewed as the “volatility parameter” for the
bond price. In the stochastic setting, the volatility can be thought of as reflecting mixed
views of expectations contained in the market prices of options of different strikes. The
calibration of the implied volatility skew therefore can be used to extract this information
from the market prices. This is different from the more conventional idea of modelling the
volatility explicitly with a structural model; instead, we “filter” it from the factor that drives
it.
2.2 Setup
Let us formally introduce the stochastic information model. As before, our financial market
is specified by the probability space (Ω,F ,Q); we assume the existence of a preferred
pricing kernel, and the absence of arbitrage. The deterministic discounting system {PtT} is
as introduced before. The information process at time t that generates the market filtration
Ft is defined by
ξt = σˉXT t + βtT , (2.1)
where XT and βtT are random variables denoting the terminal payoff and the Brownian
bridge process, respectively. The information revealing rate parameter σˉ is now a random
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variable taking values {σ1, ∙ ∙ ∙ , σm} with probabilities {q1, ∙ ∙ ∙ , qm}. All variables are
assumed independent. For the moment we take σˉ to be a discrete random variable for
simplicity. However, as we show below, for the process (2.1) to form market filtration σˉ in
fact has to be discrete.
2.3 Meaning of the information process
Before we proceed to investigate properties of the model with a random information flow
rate in detail, let us first comment on the interpretation of the information process (2.1). In
general, in a financial market, even if we make the simplifying assumption that the only
relevant market factor is the cash flowXT , there are plenty of information sources available
for XT , each being obscured by noise. We can therefore represent each of the information
source in the signal-plus-noise form (1.2) and write
ξ1t = σ1XT t + β
1
tT
.
.
.
ξnt = σnXT t + β
n
tT
(2.2)
for the family of information processes available in the market concerning the impend-
ing cash flow XT . The various noise processes {βitT}i=1,...,n in general may be mutually
correlated (with correlation matrix ρ), but they are all independent of XT .
An important point to observe now is the fact that the aggregate information processes (2.2)
is somewhat redundant; the information relevant to the cash flow XT contained in (2.2) can
be represented in the form of a single information process (1.2), with the choice
σ2 =
Σni σ
2
i ρ
−1
ii − 2Σi 6=jσiσjρ−1ij
det(ρ)
(2.3)
for the effective information flow rate, and
βtT =
1
σ
(
ΣNi,jσiρ
−1
ij β
i
tT
)
for the effective noise. Here ρ−1ij denotes the ij element of the inverse correlation matrix.
Putting the matter differently, the filtration generated jointly by the set of information pro-
cesses (2.2) is equivalent to the filtration generated jointly by the single information process
(1.2) and a family of noise processes given by combinations of {βitT}. However, since the
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noise terms are independent of XT , they make no contribution towards the pricing of the
asset. We can therefore discard them altogether and represent the totality of ‘relevant’
information in the form of a single information process (2.1).
Remark: In the case of a pair of information processes for the same market factor XT , the
construction of an effective information process is used effectively in [13] to characterise
the behaviour of an informed trader having access to additional noisy information.
2.4 Sensitivity analysis
It is of interest to identify the sensitivity of the BHM model (1.2) to the specification of the
information flow-rate parameter σ, given the fact that the value of σ is usually unknown.
Often one considers the option vega as a measure of parameter sensitivity, but here we
are interested in a global measure of parameter sensitivity. The result will be useful in
identifying the region in the parameter space for which a misspecification of the flow-rate
parameter σ yields significant errors in pricing a range of products, not just vanilla options.
A universal measure of sensitivity in statistical analysis is given by the Fisher information
[22]. To work out the Fisher information associated with the parameter σ we proceed as
follows. For simplicity, let us assume that the cash flow XT takes discrete values {xi} with
a priori probability {pi}. To determine the information measure of Fisher we need the
expression for the a posteriori probability πit = Q(XT = xi|Ft). This is given by
πit =
pi exp
(
T
T−t
(
σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t
))∑
pi exp
(
T
T−t
(
σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t
)) .
We can therefore regard {πit} = {πit(σ)} as a one-parameter family of probabilities. The
Fisher information gt(σ) associated with the parameter σ is then defined by the expression:
gt(σ) =
∑
i
1
πit(σ)
(
∂πit(σ)
∂σ
)2
.
Remark: It is interesting that the Fisher information in the case of the BHM model (1.2)
has the interpretation in terms of the conditional variance:
gt(σ) = σt
(
T
T−t
)2
Var (XT βtT |ξt) . (2.4)
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To see this, let us define
pit(σ) = pi exp
(
T
T−t
(
σxiξt − 12σ2x2i t
) )
,
so that πit = pit/
∑
i pit. We then have
∂pit(σ)
∂σ
=
T
T − t(xiξt − σx
2
i t)pit(σ),
from which it follows that
∂πit
∂σ
=
1
(
∑
i pit)
2
[
∂pit
∂σ
∑
i
pit − pit
∑
i
∂pit
∂σ
]
=
T
T − t pit
(
xiξt − σx2i t∑
i pit
−
∑
i pit(xiξt − σx2i t)
(
∑
i pit)
2
)
.
Therefore, we obtain
gt(σ) =
(
T
T − t
)2 ∑
i pit
(
xiξt − σx2i t−
∑
i pit(xiξt−σx2i t)∑
i pit
)2∑
pit
,
and by substitution of (1.2) in here we deduce (2.4).
The reason that the Fisher information gt(σ) measures the parameter sensitivity follows
from the celebrated Crame´r-Rao inequality, which shows that the variance of the param-
eter estimate is bounded below by the inverse of the Fisher information. Additionally, as
observed by Rao [47], the separation, i.e. the divergence measure associated with a pair of
models characterised by πit(σ) and πit(σ′) is determined by the integral:
Dt(σ, σ
′) =
∫ σ′
σ
√
gt(u) du. (2.5)
In figure 2.1 we show the numerical plot of the expectation E[gt(σ)] of the Fisher infor-
mation for different values of t, averaged over 1,000 sample paths. The parameters are
chosen such that {xi} = {0, 0.5, 1}, {pi} = {0.1, 0.15, 0.75}, and T = 1. We observe
that the Fisher information is increasing in σ. It is evident from the plot that the model is
quite sensitive to the choice of the information flow rate parameter σ up until about two
thirds of the way into the duration of the contract. The price of a generic derivative on a
credit risky bond, with maturity not too close to zero but also shorter than two-third of the
bond maturity, is thus likely to be sensitive to the specification of the parameter σ in the
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Figure 2.1: The unconditional expectation E[gt(σ)] of the Fisher information for differ-
ent values of t and σ. The horizontal axis represents the time remaining to the maturity.
The vertical axis represents the values of σ, ranging from 0 to 2. The numerical result
is obtained by averaging over 1,000 sample paths. The parameters are chosen such that
{xi} = {0, 0.5, 1}, {pi} = {0.1, 0.15, 0.75}, and T = 1. Where the value of E[gt(σ)] is
high, the model is on average sensitive to the choice of the specification of the parameter
σ.
most basic version of the BHM model (1.2). This sensitivity can be made more robust by
allowing σ to be random.
2.5 Quantisation of information flow rate
As indicated above, the complicated way in which the market information flow rate σ
depends on individual information flow rates {σi}, as represented in (2.3), suggests that it
is not reasonable to assume that market participants have access to the value of σ. Indeed,
in many realistic setups it is unlikely that market participants will ever learn the value of σ,
even after the value of XT is revealed. More generally, the value of σ can change over time
in a random manner. Here we shall be considering the simplest such situation in which σ
is given by a fixed random variable independent of XT and {βtT}. We observe, however,
that whether σ is a fixed random variable or a stochastic process, the FT -measurability of
XT enforces a stringent constraint on the allowable choices for σ.
To see this, let us consider a simple example. Suppose that the random cash flow XT takes
three possible values {0, 0.5, 1} with a priori probabilities {p1, p2, p3}, and σ takes two
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possible values {0.5, 1} with a priori probabilities {q1, q2}. Then there are four possible
realised values for the terminal information ξT :
ξT = σTXT =

0 ⇒ XT = 0, σ = 0.5 or 1;
0.25T ⇒ (XT , σ) = (0.5, 0.5);
0.5T ⇒ (XT , σ) = (0.5, 1) or (1, 0.5);
T ⇒ (XT , σ) = (1, 1).
(2.6)
In this case, if the realised value of ξT happens to be 0, 0.25T , or T , then we can unam-
biguously determine the value of XT irrespective of what the value of σ might have been,
whereas if the outcome happens to be 0.5T , then the value of XT could be 0.5 or 1.
This example thus illustrates the fact that once the cash flow random variable is given, the
information flow rate cannot take an arbitrary random variable. In particular, σ can not be
a continuous random variable. We define the following admissible set for σ:
Σ(XT ) = {σ : XT is FT -measurable}.
In the rest of this chapter we shall always assume that σ ∈ Σ(XT ), unless specified other-
wise. More generally, if σ = σ(t) is time dependent, then σ(t) for t < T can be arbitrary,
but the constraint discussed here for the value of σ(T ) is still applicable. Therefore, there
is a kind of “quantisation” condition imposed on σ. For the same token, in the random-σ
environment, the cash flow XT cannot be a continuous variable—this does not pose real
constraints on our approach because cash flows are in reality never continuous.
Remark: it is an unsolved problem to determine all “compatible” pairs (XT , σ) such that
σXT “reveals” XT .
2.6 Price process with a random information flow rate
Bearing in mind the quantisation condition imposed by the measurability of XT , we pro-
ceed to consider the random-σ extension of the BHM model. Specifically, we let XT take
the values {xi}i=1,...,n with a priori probabilities {pi}i=1,...,n; and let σˉ take the values
{σk}k=1,...,m with a priori probabilities {qk}k=1,...,m. These random variables are chosen
such that degenerate situations like the example given in (2.6) are excluded, and hence XT
is ensured to be FT -measurable.
We shall now determine the price of a credit-risky bond, with the new information process.
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By the fundamental theorem of asset pricing, the bond price at time t is
BtT = PtTE[XT | ξt]
= PtT
n∑
i
xiπit
where πit = Q(XT = xi|Ft) is the conditional probability for the random variable XT .
The calculation of the bond price can be simplified somewhat if the information process
{ξt} is Markovian. This, indeed, turns out to be the case, as we show below.
2.6.1 Markovian property of ξt
To show that the information process satisfies the Markov property, we need to verify that
Q(ξt ≤ x | Fs) = Q(ξt ≤ x | ξs)
for all x ∈ R and all s, t such that 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T . For this we shall follow closely the
argument of [17]. It suffices to show that
Q(ξt ≤ x | ξs, ξs1 , ..., ξsk) = Q(ξt ≤ x | ξs)
for any collection of times t, s, s1, ..., sk such that T ≥ t > s > s1 > ... > sk > 0. Using
the definition of Brownian bridge we note that
E
[
βtT
(
βsT
s
− βs1T
s1
)]
= 0,
i.e. βtT and (βsT /s − βs1T /s1) are independent. More generally, (βsT /s − βs1T /s1) and
(βs2T /s2 − βs3T /s3) are independent. We have the information process
ξt = σˉtXT + βtT ,
where both σˉ and XT are time-independent random variables, and XT is FT measurable.
Hence we can write
ξs
s
− ξs1
s1
=
βsT
s
− βs1T
s1
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and
Q(ξt ≤ x | ξs, ξs1 , ∙ ∙ ∙ , ξsk) = Q
(
ξt ≤ x | ξs, ξs
s
− ξs1
s1
, ∙ ∙ ∙ , ξsk−1
sk−1
− ξsk
sk
)
= Q
(
ξt ≤ x | ξs, βsT
s
− βs1T
s1
, ∙ ∙ ∙ , βsk−1T
sk−1
− βskT
sk
)
.
However, since ξs and ξt are independent of the remaining variables that depend only on
the noise, i.e. βsT /s − βs1T /s1, ∙ ∙ ∙ , βsk−1T /sk−1 − βskT /sk, the desired Markov property
follows immediately.
Therefore, our problem is now reduced to calculating
BtT = PtTE[XT | ξt].
This is equivalent to determining the conditional probability
πit = Q(XT = xi | ξt).
2.6.2 Conditional probability
Given the information process ξt = σˉtXT + βtT , where XT takes values xi with probabil-
ities pi for i = {1, ..., n} and σˉ takes values σk with probabilities qk for k = {1, ..., m},
there are several ways of deriving the posterior conditional probability of the random vari-
able XT using the Bayes formula. The key result that we shall be using is as follows:
Q(XT = xi | ξt) =
∑
k
Q(XT = xi, σˉ = σk|ξt) (2.7)
=
∑
k
Q(XT = xi|ξt, σˉ = σk)Q(σˉ = σk) (2.8)
=
∑
k piqkQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)∑
i
∑
k piqkQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)
(2.9)
We derive this result in three different ways. First, on account of the Bayes formula we
have
Q(XT = xi | ξt) = Q(XT = xi)Q(ξt | XT = xi)∑
iQ(XT = xi)Q(ξt | XT = xi)
=
∑
k piqkQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)∑
i
∑
k piqkQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)
.
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An alternative way of deriving from (2.7) to (2.9) is as follows:
∑
k
Q(XT = xi, σˉ = σk | ξt) =
∑
kQ(ξt, XT = xi, σˉ = σk)
Q(ξt)
=
∑
kQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)Q(xi)Q(σk)∑
iQ(ξt | XT = xi)P(xi)
=
∑
k piqkQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)∑
i
∑
k piqkQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)
.
The first equality holds because ξt does not depend on the index k. The second equality
holds is because XT and σ are independent. Finally, yet another way of establishing the
step from (2.8) to (2.9) is as follows:
∑
k
Q(σk)Q(XT = xi | ξt, σk) =
∑
k
Q(σk)
Q(ξt, XT = xi, σk)
Q(ξt, σk)
=
∑
k
Q(σk)
Q(σk | ξt, XT = xi)Q(ξt, xi, )
Q(σk | ξt)Q(ξt)
=
Q(ξt, XT = xi)
Q(ξt)
∑
k
Q(σk)
=
Q(ξt | XT = xi)Q(xi)
Q(ξt)
=
∑
k piqkQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)∑
i
∑
k piqkQ(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk)
.
On the second line, we have used the property that XT and σ are independent, which
implies that Q(σk | ξt, XT = xi) = Q(σk | ξt) and the result follows as required.
To obtain an explicit expression for Q(XT |ξt), we note that conditional on XT = xi and
σˉ = σk the random variable ξt = σˉXT t + βtT has essentially the same probability law as
the Brownian bridge βtT . Hence
Q(ξt | XT = xi, σˉ = σk) = 1√
2πt(T − t)/T exp
(
−1
2
(ξt − σkxit)2
t(T − t)/T
)
.
2.7 Credit-risky bond dynamics
Under the present model, the value of a credit-risky bond is given by BtT = PtTE[XT | ξt],
where we have assumed a deterministic discounting system PtT that is differentiable and
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strictly decreasing. Let us write
XtT = E[XT | ξt]
=
n∑
i
xiπit.
We have for the conditional probability {πit} the following expression:
πit =
∑m
k=1 piqk exp
[
T
T−t
(
xiσkξt − 12x2i σ2kt
)]∑n
s=1
∑m
r=1 psqr exp
[
T
T−t
(
xsσrξt − 12x2sσ2r t
)] . (2.10)
Thus the Bond price is given by
BtT = PtT
∑n
i
∑m
k=1 xipiqk exp
[
T
T−t
(
xiσkξt − 12x2i σ2kt
)]∑n
s=1
∑m
r=1 psqr exp
[
T
T−t
(
xsσrξt − 12x2sσ2r t
)] .
Having in hand the present value of a credit-risky bond that is formulated based on the
information process {ξt}, we would like to examine the dynamics of the bond price over
time. To see this we can work out the dynamic of the conditional probability using Ito’s
lemma. Let us write pikt = pik(t, ξ), where
pik(t, ξ) = piqk exp
[
T
T − t
(
xiσkξ − 1
2
x2i σ
2
kt
)]
.
Diffusing this, we get
dpikt =
σkT
T − txi
(
dξt +
ξt
T − tdt
)
pikt.
Summing both sides over the index k, we have
d
∑
k
pikt =
T
T − txi
(
dξt +
ξt
T − tdt
)∑
k
σkpikt.
Thus by use of Ito’s quotient rule, the dynamics of πit can be calculated as follows:
dπit
πit
=
1
πit
d
( ∑
k pikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
)
=
T
T − txi
(
dξt +
ξt
T − tdt
)∑
k σkpikt∑
k pikt
− T
T − t
(
dξt +
ξt
T − tdt
)∑
i
∑
k xiσkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
+
T 2
(T − t)2 dt
(∑
i
∑
k xiσkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
)2
− T
2
(T − t)2 xidt
∑
k σkpikt∑
k pikt
∑
i
∑
k σkxipikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
.
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Now let us denote by
S =

σ1
.
.
.
σm
 and X =

x1
.
.
.
xn

the column vectors for σk and xi, respectively; and an n×m matrix P, whose ijth element
is given by
pijt∑
i
∑
k pikt
. (2.11)
Therefore, we can write∑
i
∑
k xiσkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
= XTPS and
∑
k σkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
= PS.
Evidently,XTPS is a scalar, andPS is a column vector of n elements. As for the dynamics
of {πit} we thus have
dπit
πit
=
T
T − tdξt
[∑
k σkpikt∑
k pikt
∑
i
∑
k pikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
xi −
∑
i
∑
k xiσkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
]
+
T
T − tdt
[∑
k σkpikt∑
k pikt
∑
i
∑
k pikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
ξtxi
T − t −
∑
i
∑
k xiσkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
ξt
T − t
+
(∑
i
∑
k xiσkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
)2
T
T − t −
∑
k σkpikt∑
k pikt
∑
i
∑
k pikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
xi
∑
i
∑
k xiσkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
T
T − t
]
=
T
T − t
[
dξt
(
PS ∙ π−1it xi −XTPS
)
+ dt
1
T − t
(
PS ∙ π−1it xiξt −XTPS ∙ ξt
+ (XTPS)2T −PS ∙ π−1it xiT ∙XTPS
)]
=
T
T − t
[
PS ∙ π−1it xi −XTPS
]
dWt, (2.12)
where
dWt = dξt +
ξt
T − tdt−
T
T − tX
TPSdt. (2.13)
The dynamics of the conditional probability, given by (2.12), describes how the posterior
probability evolves, and this in turn determines the bond price dynamic. We shall now
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show that the process {Wt}0≤t≤T is an {F ξt }−martingale. For t ≤ u:
E[Wu | F ξt ] = Wt + E[(ξu − ξt) | ξt] + E
[∫ u
t
ξs
T − sds
∣∣∣∣ ξt]− TE [∫ u
t
XTPS
T − s ds
∣∣∣∣ ξt]
= Wt + E [σˉXT u + βuT | ξt]− E [σˉXT t + βtT | ξt] + E[σˉXT | ξt]
∫ u
t
s
T − sds
+E
[∫ u
t
βsT
T − sds
∣∣∣∣ ξt]− E[XTPS | ξt] ∫ u
t
T
T − sds. (2.14)
The quantity XTPS is ξt measurable hence we can write
E[XTPS | ξt] = XTPS.
On the other hand, the term XTPS can be interpreted as the a posterior expectation of XT
and σˉ,
XTPS = E[σˉXT | ξt].
Hence all the terms with XT in (2.14) cancel, and we have
E[Wu | F ξt ] = Wt + E[βuT | ξt]− E[βtT | ξt] +
∫ u
t
1
T − sE[βsT | ξt]ds. (2.15)
Using the tower property of conditional expectation and the independence of {βtT} and
σXtT , we deduce that
E[βuT | ξt] = E[E[βuT | βtT ] | ξt].
Also using the relation that
E
[
βuT
T − u −
βtT
T − t
∣∣∣∣ βtT] = 0,
we conclude
E[βuT | ξt] = E[E[βuT | βtT ] | ξt] = T − u
T − t E[βtT | ξt].
Substituting this expression into (2.15) we obtain the martingale relation
E[Wu | F ξt ] = Wt.
In addition, we have
(dWt)
2 = (dξt)
2 = (dβtT )
2 = dt.
It follows, by virtue of the Le´vy criterion, that {Wt} is an {Ft}-Brownian motion.
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The process {Wt} is indeed the process that “drives” the asset price dynamics. It depends
in a highly nontrivial way on both the signal component of the information flow, as well as
on the noise term. We are now in a position to assess the stochastic dynamics of the Bond
price. Since
BtT = PtT
∑
i
xiπit,
we have
dBtT = rtBtT dt + PtT
T
T − t
[∑
i
x2i ∙PS−XTPS ∙
∑
i
xiπit
]
dWt
= rtBtT dt + PtT
T
T − t
[
E[X2T σˉ | ξt]− E[XT | ξt] ∙ E[XT σˉ | ξt]
]
dWt
= rtBtT dt + PtT
T
T − tV
σ
tT dWt.
We find that the absolute volatility of the bond price process is controlled by the covariance
of XT and XT σ:
V σtT = E[X2T σˉ | ξt]− E[XT | ξt] ∙ E[XT σˉ | ξt].
In the case that σ and XT are independent we have:
V σtT = E[σˉ | ξt]
(
E[X2T | ξt]− E2[XT | ξt]
)
= E[σˉ | ξt]VtT ,
where VtT is the conditional variance of XT given ξt. We see that if σ is constant then our
model reduces to the original bond pricing formula in the BHM framework [15].
2.8 Volatility dynamics
Let us now work out the “Vol-of-Vol” for the bond price to examine the rate of decay of
V σtT . This is of interest in connection with the pricing of options on realised volatility or
variance swaps. For notational simplicity, we write Et[∙] ≡ E[∙ | ξt]. Recall that V σtT is
defined by the covariance of XT and XT σˉ. Let us express this in terms of pikt:
V σtT =
∑
i
∑
k x
2
i σkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
−
∑
i
∑
k xipikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
∑
i
∑
k xiσkpikt∑
i
∑
k pikt
,
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and define the joint conditional probability of XT and σˉ by
πσikt ≡
pikt∑
l
∑
m plmt
. (2.16)
Following a line of calculation similar to the one performed in the previous section, we
deduce that
dπσikt =
T
T − t (xiσˉ − Et[XT σˉ]) π
σ
iktdWt, (2.17)
where dWt is defined as before. This equation governs the dynamics of the joint probability
for XT and σˉ. The conditional covariance process can be rewritten as:
V σtT =
∑
i
∑
k
x2i σkπ
σ
ikt −XtT
∑
i
∑
k
xiσkπ
σ
ikt,
where XtT ≡ E[XT | ξt] is the conditional expectation of XT . Applying Ito’s lemma, we
obtain
dV σtT =
∑
i
∑
k
xiσk [−πσiktdXtT + xidπσikt −XtT dπσikt − (dXtT )(dπσikt)] .
On the other hand, for the dynamics of {XtT} we have
dXtT =
T
T − tV
σ
tT dWt.
Combining these, we get
dV σtT = −
(
T
T − t
)2
V σtT V
XT σ
tT dt +
T
T − tκ
σ
tT dWt, (2.18)
where
V XT σtT ≡ Et[X2T σˉ2]− (Et[XT σˉ])2
is the conditional variance of the random variable XT σˉ, and
κσtT ≡ −Et[XT ](V σtT + V XT σtT ) + Covt(XTσˉ, X2Tσˉ),
is the conditional skewness of the terminal payoff. The Vol-of-Vol, {∑(2)tT }, is thus given
by
Σ
(2)
tT =
(
T
T − t
)2
PtT κ
σ
tT .
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2.9 Information-flow rate process
It is worth noting that the dynamics of the conditional expectation of the information flow
rate, σˉ, can be read off from the foregoing analysis. This follows from the fact that we have
obtained the joint density for the random variables XT and σˉ, as characterised by the prob-
ability matrix P; thus by reduction to the marginal probability we obtain the conditional
density for σˉ. It should be evident from the structure of the information process
ξt = σˉXT t + βtT (2.19)
that the roles of XT and σˉ are in fact virtually interchangeable, except that while XT is
necessarily {F ξT}-measurable, σˉ need not be so. If we let {πXit } and {πσˉkt} denote, respec-
tively, the two marginal probabilities for XT and σˉ, then the measurability properties imply
that limt→T πXit = δij for some index j corresponding to the realised value xj of the cash
flow XT , while in general
lim
t→T
πσˉit 6= δkl (2.20)
for any index l.
In any event, by summing the rows of the matrix P we obtain the marginal probability:
πσˉkt =
∑n
i=1 piqk exp
[
T
T−t
(
xiσkξt − 12x2i σ2kt
)]∑n
i=1
∑m
k=1 piqk exp
[
T
T−t
(
xiσkξt − 12x2i σ2kt
)] .
It follows that the conditional expectation σˉt = E[σˉ | ξt] of the flow-rate parameter is given
by
σˉt =
∑m
k=1
∑n
i=1 σkpiqk exp
[
T
T−t
(
xiσkξt − 12x2i σ2kt
)]∑n
i=1
∑m
k=1 piqk exp
[
T
T−t
(
xiσkξt − 12x2i σ2kt
)] .
2.10 Analysis of path behaviour
In this section we analyse the path behaviour of a digital bond under the “uncertain informa-
tion” model through simulation studies. This provides us with a better and more intuitive
understanding of the characteristics of the model under study. In figures 2.2 and 2.3 we
have shown simulations of sample paths of the bond price processes, the corresponding av-
eraged (over five sample paths) volatility process, and the averaged (again, over five sample
paths) vol-of-vol process. In these plots, we have set r = 0% for simplicity; and the ma-
turity of the digital bond is T = 1 year. The information flow rate in figure 2.2 is chosen
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Figure 2.2: Simulated bond price (left), volatility (top right) and Vol-of-Vol (bottom right)
processes in uncertain information model with σˉ = {0.6, 0.8}, qk = {0.5, 0.5}, XT =
{0, 1}, pi = {0.2, 0.8}, r = 0% and T = 1.
to be a binary random variable taking values {0.6, 0.8} with an equal a priori probability;
whereas in figure 2.3, σˉ takes the values {0.4, 1.0} also with an equal a priori probability.
Hence in both cases we have E[σˉ] = 0.7, but they have different standard deviations.
One interesting observation to be drawn from the present simulation studies, as compared
to the original BHM model, is that the degree of variation of the sample paths, i.e. the
variability, is smaller than those observed in the BHM model with the same σ value. For
example, although one of the sample paths in figure 2.3 has the value σ = 1, which in the
BHM model would have caused the paths to reach their terminal values at about four-fifth
of the way, such a large variation is not present in our uncertain information model. This
is because the conditional expectation of XT involves products of the a priori probability
{qk}, and this “dampens” the overall variability. If we set one of the qk’s equal to zero,
which reduces the model to the original BHM, then the damping effect disappears. This
behaviour is plausible because market participants are uncertain about the true information
flow rate; their knowledge of the information is made additionally fuzzy by the uncertainty
in σˉ, and hence it generally takes a longer time to discover the true terminal cash flow. This
uncertainty will, consequently, reduce the overall volatility for the majority of the duration
of the bond. The reduction in volatility becomes apparent when we look at the average of
the processes.
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Figure 2.3: Simulated bond price (left), volatility (top right) and Vol-of-Vol (bottom right)
processes in uncertain information model with σ = {0.4, 1}, qk = {0.5, 0.5}, XT = {0, 1},
pi = {0.2, 0.8}, r = 0% and T = 1.
The volatility of the processes in some sense reflects the “learning rate” of the terminal
value of the bond price (or, equivalently, the value of XT ). This learning rate is somewhat
slowed down in the uncertain information model, hence resulting in the dampening of the
volatility. If the standard deviation of σˉ is very small, then the volatility process almost
matches that of the BHM model. However, as the standard deviation of σˉ is made wider so
that the true information becomes less clear, this leads to a reduction in the price volatility.
Nevertheless, as time passes, the value of XT must eventually be revealed, and this leads
to a subtle behaviour in the averaged volatility.
In view of this, we have investigated further the behaviour of the volatility processes. Be-
cause in our example here the random variable σˉ is chosen such that it is not measurable
for any t ∈ [0, T ], we can expect some degrees of uncertainty to sustain until the very last
moment. Indeed, the behaviour of the price process in the uncertain information model is
not entirely counterintuitive; we expect, for example, that the price process behaves like a
mixture of the BHM with the probabilities {qk} denoting the weights of the possible sce-
narios of σk. That this intuition is more or less correct, albeit there are subtle details, is
illustrated in figure 2.4, in which the mean volatility ΣˉtT = E[ΣtT ] associated with various
distributions for σˉ are compared. The two solid lines represent ΣˉtT corresponding to the
original BHM model, with the top line at t = 0 taking the value σ = 0.9 and the bottom
line at t = 0 taking the value σ = 0.5. The dashed lines are mean volatilities generated
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by our uncertain information model. They take values σk = {0.5, 0.9} with the follow-
ing probabilities: from the top at t = 0, qk = {0, 1}; qk = {0.1, 0.9}; qk = {0.2, 0.8};
qk = {0.3, 0.7}, and so on, until qk = {1, 0} for the bottom dashed line that coincides with
the solid line.
Figure 2.4: Each line represents the average of 5,000 sample paths of volatility processes.
The two solid lines are that of the original BHM model with the top and bottom line taking
σ = 0.9 and σ = 0.5 respectively, XT = {0, 1}, pi = {0.2, 0.8}, r = 0% and T = 5.
The dashed lines are mean volatilities of the uncertain information model taking values,
from top to bottom respectively, σk = {0.5, 0.9} with qk = {0, 1}, qk = {0.1, 0.9}, qk =
{0.2, 0.8}, . . . , and qk = {1, 0}.
The result reveals the following features: First, we see that when σ = 0.5 the average
volatility starts with a lower value as compared to that of σ = 0.9; but eventually over-
rides the latter because information is revealed towards the end, and hence causing higher
volatility. Second, we see that as we shift the mean of σ from 0.9 to 0.5, the mean volatility
shifts accordingly. The graph shows that the mean volatility of the random σ model be-
haves like a weighted sum of the BHMmean volatilities, with weights given by the a priori
probability {qk}. In this regard, the random information model studied here can be viewed
as a kind of BHM mixture model.
We also draw attention to the limiting behaviour of the mean volatility as t → T . In figure
2.5 we see clearly that the mean volatility of the random information model does not reach
zero when t is very close to T , even though that of the BHM model has. This indicates
that there are “last minute surprises” because information regarding the terminal value is
still uncertain, due to the additional uncertainty in σˉ. This is the essence of the random
information flow rate model, as it truly describes the uncertainty in the market up until the
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Figure 2.5: Magnification of the averages of volatility processes. Each line represents the
average of 5,000 paths of volatility processes. The solid lines are that of the original BHM
model with the top and bottom line taking σ = 0.9 and σ = 0.5, respectively, XT = {0, 1},
pi = {0.2, 0.8}, r = 0% and T = 5. The dashed lines are mean volatilities of the uncertain
information model taking the values, from top to bottom respectively, σk = {0.5, 0.9} with
qk = {0, 1}, qk = {0.1, 0.9}, qk = {0.2, 0.8}, . . . , and qk = {1, 0}.
last moment. Note, however, that values of mean volatility above t & 0.996T were not
available numerically, due to the existence of a cancellation of large numbers that is not
recognised in the numerical code developed for our simulation studies.
We remark that from the expression (2.10) of the dynamics of the conditional probability
process, dπit has an overall scaling term T/(T − t) which diverges as t → T . While the
terms multiplying to this approach zero faster than T − t, making the expression well de-
fined analytically, this divergence causes an issue in the simulation studies as one discretise
the time steps. We observe that for sufficiently large values of σk, i.e. σk > 0.7, the aver-
age path can have a slight hump when t is very close to the maturity date, even though the
terminal value stays unchanged.
2.11 Mutual information analysis
An alternative way of investigating properties of the price process is to study the behaviour
of mutual information between BtT and XT , or, equivalently, between ξt and XT . This is
the quantity that measures the amount of information contained in the asset price about the
value of the impending cash flow (cf. [24, 38] for further detail on the concept of mutual
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information), and thus represents how much the market has learned about the value of XT
[13]. The mutual information is obtained by determining the expression:
J(ξt, XT ) =
n∑
i
∫ ∞
−∞
ρξX(x, i) ln
(
ρξX(x, i)
ρξ(x)ρX(i)
)
dx,
where
ρξX(x, i) =
d
dx
Q [(ξt < x) ∩ (XT = xi)]
is the joint density function of the random variables (ξt, XT ), and ρξ, ρX are the respective
marginal probabilities. By the independence of XT and σ, we find that
Q [(ξt < x) ∩ (XT = xi)] =
m∑
k
Q(ξt < x | XT = xi, σ = σk)Q(XT = xi)Q(σ = σk),
from which it follows that
ρξX(x, i) =
m∑
k
qkpi
1√
2πt(T − t)/T exp
(
−1
2
(x− σkxit)2
t(T − t)/T
)
since conditional on XT = xi and σ = σk, the random variable ξt is normally distributed
with mean σkxit and variance t(T − t)/T .
An alternative way of deriving the mutual information is to use the formula [13]
J(ξt, XT ) = H0 − E[Ht],
where the Shannon-Wiener entropy {Ht} is defined by the expression
Ht = −
n∑
i=1
πit ln πit.
2.11.1 Limiting property of mutual information
The entropy process {Ht}0≤t<T has the property that limt→T Ht = 0. This follows from
the fact that the conditional probability process {πit}0≤t<T has the limiting behaviour
lim
t→T
πit(ω) = 1{XT (ω) = xi}
2.11 Mutual information analysis 48
for i = 1, . . . , n. To see this, suppose that for some ω ∈ Ω we have XT (ω) = xa and
σ(ω) = σb for some a, b. For this realisation the information process is
ξt = σbtxa + βtT .
Substituting this expression of ξt into the expression for πit, and dividing the denominator
and the numerator by the exponential factor containing xa and σb, we deduce that
πat =
pa
(
qb +
∑
k 6=b qk exp
[
T
T−t
(
xa(σk − σb)βtT − 12x2a(σk − σb)2t
)])
paqb +
∑
i 6=a
∑
k 6=b piqk exp
[
T
T−t
(
(xiσk − xaσb)βtT − 12(x2i σ2j − x2aσ2b )t
)] .
As t → T all of the terms in the sums vanish. Therefore, limt→T πat = 1 and furthermore,
since ∑
i
πit = 1
for all t, we must have
lim
t→T
πit = 0
for i 6= a. Finally, since
Ht = − ln
n∏
i=1
ππitit ,
we deduce that
lim
t→T
Ht = 0.
In figure 2.6 we provide a graphical illustration of the behaviour of the mutual information.
The idea here is to relate this with the behaviour of the average volatility that we observed
in the previous section. We have used exactly the same parameter values to make the
comparison more transparent. Hence, the mutual information for the BHM model with
σ = 0.9 and σ = 0.5 form the upper and lower bounds, respectively, at early times in
figure 2.6. The mutual information, or, the learning curves that lie within these bounds
at early times are those under the uncertain information model, taking the values σk =
{0.5, 0.9} with probabilities qk = {0, 1}, qk = {0.1, 0.9}, ∙ ∙ ∙ , qk = {1, 0}, respectively,
from top to bottom.
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Figure 2.6: Mutual information under the random σ model. The vertical axis repre-
sents the mutual information and the horizontal axis represents the time elapsed. We
let σk = {0.5, 0.9} with probabilities, from top to bottom at early times, qk = {0, 1},
qk = {0.1, 0.9}, . . . , qk = {1, 0} respectively; XT = {0, 1}, pi = {0.2, 0.8}, and T = 5.
The results shown in the figure match exactly the findings of the mean volatility analysis.
The gap in the plots close to t = T is again due to numerical limitations. Observe the
crossover pattern seen here, as we change the distribution of σˉ. The processes with a low
mutual information at early times cross the higher ones at later times because the volatility
is greater towards the end so as to “catch up” with the learning rate. Further, there are still
uncertainties left until the very last moment.
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Chapter 3
Options on Credit-risky Bonds with
Random Information Flows
In this chapter we examine the pricing of options on credit-risky bonds. In particular, we
work out in semi-closed form, up to numerical root-finding, pricing formulae for European-
style call options on a bond. The results are expressed in terms of the BHM implied volatil-
ity parameter, exhibiting familiar smile characteristics. What this means is that the elemen-
tary stochastic volatility model introduced in the previous chapter has not only the analyti-
cal tractability but also sufficient flexibility to fit implied volatility surfaces. We shall also
determine the sensitivity of the option price with respect to the initial bond price. These
results show that our random-information model entails a significant degree of practicality.
3.1 Option pricing formula
Following a procedure similar to the one provided in [17], we consider the valuation of a
European call option on the asset described in the previous chapter, exercisable at a fixed
time t > 0 on a defaultable bond maturing at time T > t with strike price K. The value of
the call option at time zero is
C0 = P0tE[(BtT −K)+]
= P0tE
[(∑
i
PtT πitxi −K
)+]
, (3.1)
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where the conditional probability πit is as given in (2.10). Let us write
pikt = piqk exp
[
T
T − t
(
xiσkξt − 1
2
x2i σ
2
kt
)]
,
πit =
∑
k pikt
Φt
,
Φt =
∑
i
∑
k
pikt. (3.2)
Then equation (3.1) can be rewritten as
C0 = P0tE
[
1
Φt
(∑
i
∑
k
(PtT xi −K)pikt
)+]
. (3.3)
Our objective now is to determine this expectation.
3.2 Measure change technique
In order to derive the formula for the option price we shall use a change of measure tech-
nique. In particular, the factor Φ−1t appearing in (3.3) will be used to effect a measure
change. First we show that {Φ−1t }, as defined in (3.2), can be expressed in the form of a
unit-initialised exponential martingale. We then show that the Novikov condition is satis-
fied, and thus {Φ−1t } can be used as a density martingale to change the measure. Let us fix
u such that t ≤ u < T , and define a process {Φt}0≤t≤u by (3.2). Recall the dynamics of
pikt:
dpikt
pikt
=
[
T
(T − t)2
(
σkxiξt − 1
2
σ2kx
2
i t
)
− 1
2
T
T − tσ
2
kx
2
i
]
dt
+
T
T − tσkxidξt +
1
2
T 2
(T − t)2 σ
2
kx
2
i (dξt)
2
=
T 2
(T − t)2 σkxiE[σˉXT | ξt]dt +
T
T − tσkxidWt
Summing over indices i and k, and making use of the relation
1
Φt
∑
i
∑
k
xiσkpikt = E[σˉXT | ξt],
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we obtain
dΦt =
T 2
(T − t)2E
2[σˉXT | ξt]Φtdt + T
T − tE[σˉXT | ξt]ΦtdWt.
Applying Ito’s quotient rule, we deduce that the dynamical equation satisfied by the random
process {Φ−1t } is
dΦ−1t = −
T
T − tE[σˉXT | ξt]Φ
−1
t dWt.
The solution to this equation is given by
Φ−1t = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
T
T − sE[σˉXT | ξs]dWs −
1
2
∫ t
0
T 2
(T − s)2E
2[σˉXT | ξs]ds
)
. (3.4)
Since E[σˉXT | ξt] is bounded, we see that the Novikov condition
E
[
exp
(
−1
2
∫ t
0
T 2
(T − s)2E
2[σˉXT | ξs]ds
)]
< ∞
is satisfied for any t ≤ u. Hence {Φ−1t }0≤t≤u is a martingale. We also see from the
normalisation condition that
Φ−10 =
(∑
i
∑
k
piqk
)−1
= 1, (3.5)
and hence
E[Φ−1t ] = 1.
Thus, the factor Φ−1t can be used to effect a change of measure. The option price becomes,
under the new measure,
C0 = P0tEBT
[(∑
i
∑
k
(PtT −K)pikt
)+]
. (3.6)
As in the original BHM model reviewed in chapter 1, we shall call this new measure the
“bridge measure”, denoted BT , because under this measure the information process {ξt} is
a standard Brownian bridge. That is to say, the random variable ξt is Gaussian with mean
0 and variance t(T − t)/T under the BT measure. We note first some general remarks
concerning this measure change. The Radon-Nikodym derivative is dBT = Φ−1t dQ; the
random variables XT and σˉ have the same probability laws with respect to BT and Q.
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Furthermore, the conditional expectation of any integrable function f(XT , σˉ) under the
bridge measure can be expressed as
EBT [f(XT , σˉ) | Ft] = E
Q[Φ−1t f(XT , σˉ) | Ft]
EQ[Φ−1t | Ft]
.
In particular, the process {W ∗t }0≤t≤u defined by
W ∗t =
∫ t
0
T
T − sE[σˉXT | ξs]ds + Wt (3.7)
is a BT−Brownian motion.
To verify that the process {ξt} is a BT−Brownian bridge, we begin by redefining the above
{Wt} process in the Q measure by the use of equation (2.13):
Wt = ξt +
∫ t
0
ξs
T − sds−
∫ t
0
T
T − sE[σˉXT | ξs]ds.
Substituting this expression into equation (3.7) we get
W ∗t = ξt +
∫ t
0
ξs
T − sds.
From this relation we obtain an SDE of the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck type:
dξt = − ξt
T − tdt + dW
∗
t .
The solution to the SDE above is given by
ξt = (T − t)
∫ t
0
1
T − sdW
∗
s .
We see that under the BT measure the process {W ∗s }0≤s≤t is a Brownian motion with the
Radon-Nikodym derivative given by (3.4) , hence {ξs}0≤s≤t, defined above, is a standard
Brownian bridge process, as claimed.
Returning to the problem of option pricing, let us begin by considering the case of a binary
bond, whereby the cash flow takes the two possible values {x0, x1}. Then we have
C0 = P0tEBT
[(
(PtT x1 −K)
∑
k
p1kt + (PtT x0 −K)
∑
k
p0kt
)+]
. (3.8)
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From equation (3.6), this expectation is nontrivial when PtT x1 > K > PtT x0. Otherwise,
the option will be sure to expire either in the money or out of the money. In the nontrivial
case, the option can expire either in the money or out of the money, depending on whether
ξt > ξ
∗ or ξt < ξ∗, where ξ∗ is the unique critical value of ξt such that BtT = K, or,
equivalently, the unique solution to the equation∑
k qk exp(
T
T−t(σkx0ξ
∗ − 1
2
σ2kx
2
0t))∑
k qk exp(
T
T−t(σkx1ξ
∗ − 1
2
σ2kx
2
1t))
=
p1(K − PtT x1)
p0(PtT x0 −K) . (3.9)
Note that in general ξ∗ has no closed-form expression. However, the solution to (3.9) can
be obtained by simple numerical root-finding methods. That the solution to (3.9) is unique
(assuming that σˉ is a positive random variable so that σk > 0 for all k) can be seen from
the fact that the bond price is an increasing function of ξt. To see this, let us define B(t, ξ)
by
B(t, ξ) = PtT
∑n
i
∑m
k=1 xipiqk exp
[
T
T−t
(
xiσkξ − 12x2i σ2kt
)]∑n
s=1
∑m
r=1 psqr exp
[
T
T−t
(
xsσrξ − 12x2sσ2r t
)]
so that the bond price is given by BtT = B(t, ξt). We then differentiate B(t, ξ) in ξ to get
∂B(t, ξ)
∂ξ
∣∣∣∣
ξ=ξt
= PtT
T
T − t
(∑
i
∑
k piktx
2
i σk∑
i
∑
k pikt
−
∑
i
∑
k xipikt
∑
j
∑
l xjσlpjlt
[
∑∑
pikt]
2
)
= PtT
T
T − t
(
E[X2T σ | ξt]− E[XT | ξt]E[XT σ | ξt]
)
= PtT
T
T − tV
σ
tT
≥ 0
and hence B(t, ξt) is an increasing function of ξt. It follows that there exists a unique ξ∗t
that satisfies equation (3.9).
The problem of option pricing thus reduces to performing an elementary Gaussian integra-
tion. We now consider the case where XT need not be a binary variable. The computation
simplifies further if we introduce a standard normal variable Z according to
Z =
ξt√
t(T − t)/T .
We write Z∗ for the corresponding critical value. Then the option pricing formula is:
C0 = P0t
∑
k
∑
i
qkpi(PtT xi −K)N(
√
τσkxi − Z∗), (3.10)
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where τ = tT/(T − t) and N(∙) denotes the standard cumulative normal density function.
Below are plots of call option prices against strike for various values of the option maturity
t, for both the BHM and the random information models:
Figure 3.1: Call price against strike for different option maturities under the BHM (left)
and uncertain information (right) models. We see that options with longer maturities are
less expensive in the random information model, for any strike price. This is because the
additional uncertainty in σ indeed reduces volatility in the initial stage of a long maturity
option. As the options approach maturity the two models become the same.
3.3 Sensitivity analysis
Having obtained the expression for the option price, it is natural to examine the option
sensitivity against the initial price of the underlying, i.e. the option delta. In this connection
it is worth remarking that in the context of credit risk modelling, the option delta is usually
difficult to determine because the models commonly used are driven by jump processes.
The advantage of the BHM approach, on the other hand, is that it allows for the use of a
Brownian-based filtration to generate the dynamics of a credit-risky bond. This means that
the option delta can be determined explicitly, just as in the Black-Scholes model. Here we
shall work out the expression for the delta
Δ =
∂C0
∂B0T
.
in our extended model. To determine the option delta, let us first consider the case of an
option on a digital bond as a starting point. By definition we have the following relations:
B0T = P0T (p0x0 + p1x1), and p0 + p1 = 1.
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Substituting these into equation (3.10) we get
C0 = P0T
[
1
x1 − x0
(
B0T
P0T
− x0
)∑
k
qk(PtT x1 −K)N(
√
τσkx1 − Z∗)
+
1
x1 − x0
(
x1 − B0T
P0T
)∑
k
qk(PtT x0 −K)N(
√
τσkx0 − Z∗)
]
.
Upon differentiation with respect to B0T , we obtain:
Δ =
∑
k qk(PtT x1 −K)N(d1k)−
∑
k qk(PtT x0 −K)N(d0k)
PtT (x1 − x0) ,
where
dik =
√
τσkxi − Z∗ for i = 1, 2.
We note that, apart from the option delta, we can consider other sensitivity indicators com-
monly characterised by the various “Greeks”. In addition, in our example we can determine
the sensitivity of the option price against the degree of uncertainty in the magnitude of the
volatility σˉ. In particular, in the binary case where we have q0 = q and q1 = 1 − q. Thus,
letting
ν =
√
qσ20 + (1− q)σ21 − (qσ0 + (1− q)σ1)2
denote the standard deviation of σˉ the sensitivity of the call price against the “informational
volatility”, ν can easily be calculated by use of the chain rule.
3.4 Stochastic volatility
As remarked earlier, the random information model considered here is an elementary ex-
ample of a stochastic volatility model for option pricing, since the price process depends
on the distribution of σˉ. The advantage of this model is that we do not have to explicitly
define the structure, i.e. the probability law of the volatility, since this can be calibrated
from options data. But exactly how do we calibrate the distribution of σˉ in order to fix the
price process?
We shall proceed as follows: First, note that the original BHMmodel is a “constant” volatil-
ity model (where we take the liberty to call the parameter σ the volatility). Thus, option
prices given by the original BHM cannot match market prices across different values of
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strike K, just as in the Black-Scholes model. Therefore, if we regard the BHM model as
the benchmark model, then we expect to observe a volatility smile across different strike
prices, if we calibrate the BHM for at-the-money option price. What this means is that we
can quote the prices of bond options in terms of the BHM implied volatility parameter, just
as in the equity market where the Black-Scholes implied volatility is used to quote prices.
Alternatively, in the random information model we can calibrate the BHM implied volatil-
ity surface by means of adjusting the parameters {qk} and {σk}. Numerical studies indi-
cate that with a small number of parameters, a relatively wide range of volatility surfaces
can be fitted reasonably well. To illustrate the idea, here we have taken specific values
σk = {0.3, 2.7} and qk = {0.5, 0.5} for the model parameters to compute the option prices
across different strikes and different maturities, and expressed these prices in terms of the
BHM implied volatility. The results are shown in figure 3.1 and figure 3.2, representing a
characteristic “smile” surface where there are stronger skews for shorter maturities.
Figure 3.2: The implied BHM volatility. The implied volatility surface resulting from cal-
ibrating each strike and maturity of the random information model to the BHM model
is shown. The parameters are set to be XT = {0, 1}, pi = {0.2, 0.8}, σaverage = 1.5,
σRand = {0.3, 2.7}, qk = {0.5, 0.5}, r = 0% and T ∈ [0, 2].
3.5 Remarks on the random information and the BHM mixture
We have noted that our random information model can be viewed as a mixture of BHM
models. In the context of the Black-Scholes model, Renault and Touzi [48] or Brigo et al.
[10], for instance, have carried out a similar analysis, where the Black-Scholes volatility pa-
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rameter σ is taken to be a time-dependent random variable that is nevertheless independent
of the underlying Brownian motion. By conditioning on the volatility path, the European
call option is obtained as the expectation of the Black-Scholes call price with time-averaged
volatility. In particular, when σ is time-independent, the result of [10, 48] for the extended
Black-Scholes model is similar in nature to our result on the extended BHM model.
The randomisation of the Black-Scholes volatility parameter (the so-called log-normal mix-
ture) in the literature is carried out essentially in an ad hoc manner, without any fundamen-
tal economic reason. Rather, it is justified on the practical grounds that it gives a better
handling of calibration.
In contrast, in our model the randomisation arises from a more realistic analysis on the
structure of the market information process; in particular, from the fundamental observa-
tion that the information flow rate is virtually always random and in many cases is not
even observable. Hence, although the net effect is similar in both cases, our model is ac-
companied by a better justification, which in turn also gives a better justification for the
lognormal mixture models. In particular, since the log-normal model can also be derived
from the information-based framework [17, 42], we can now assign a deeper significance
to the log-normal mixture models.
3.6 Information manipulation
We conclude by drawing attention to another interesting feature of the variable σ model.
This concerns the notion of information manipulation, or, equivalently, a deliberate mis-
representation of information. The question that we are interested in here is the following:
How does one model the manipulation of information in the information-based framework?
One possible solution is given by the mis-specification of the information flow-rate σ.
The idea can be sketched as follows. Each market agent reveals information, expressed
in the form of one of the information processes of (4.3). The impact of that agent’s in-
formation on the market is then determined through formula (4.4). If an agent releases
information that is based purely on speculation, then that information source is noise dom-
inated, having a small value of the information flow rate. However, if that agent is trying
to mislead the market, based on a reliable piece of information, then the nature of unre-
liability of that information is not the same as that arising from pure noise. Instead, this
misinformation can be modelled by the fact that the agent provides an incorrect value for
the information flow rate parameter. In this way, the market will estimate the fair price
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Figure 3.3: Left: Sample paths of the BHM, i.e. bond price against time elapsed, with
σ = 1 (blue) and σ = −1 (red) using same Brownian bridges; and the corresponding skew
processes associated with XT (ω) = 1 (Top right) and XT (ω) = 1 (Bottom right). Here we
set XT = {0, 1}, pi = {0.2, 0.8}, r = 0% and T = 5.
of the asset by use of the pricing formula (4.5), but based on the incorrect value for the
information flow rate parameter. As a consequence, the market price will be misled.
As an illustration of this behaviour, in figure 3.3 we show sample paths for the defaultable
digital bond price process—in one case where the bond did not default, whereas in the other
case where the bond defaulted. In each case, two sample paths are given; one corresponding
to where the true market price ought to be if there is no misleading information, and one
corresponding to where the realised price is, owing to the existence of a deliberate price
manipulation.
In order to make the effect of price manipulation visually pronounced, here we have taken
a slightly extreme case in which the true value of the information flow rate is σ = +1
(blue), whereas the “conjugate” price process is generated by the false belief that the flow
rate is given by σ = −1 (red). We find in these examples the existence of a kind of anti-
correlation between the “true” and “false” prices around their conditional means. This is
illustrate more clearly in the skewness plot, also shown in figure 3.3.
One might enquire in which way a mis-specification of the information flow rate σ is re-
alised in practice. In this connection it is worth remarking that there is an extended literature
on price manipulation, often in the context of insider trading. One typical way of spreading
a false information is by taking a trading position in a strategic manner (cf. [2, 20]).
For example, suppose that an informed trader has the information that the price of an asset
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is likely to drop in near future. In this case, taking a short position amounts to effectively
revealing the content of that information. Hence, by momentarily taking a long position
before taking a short position, an informed trader can mislead the market. One can think of
such a deliberate manoeuvre being represented abstractly in the form of one of the infor-
mation processes in (4.3) taking an “incorrect” value of σ.
We see therefore that the information-based framework allows for a range of flexible ex-
tensions to model various scenarios that might occur in a given financial market. It would
be of considerable interest, in particular, to develop further the information-based approach
to model various form of price manipulations.
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Chapter 4
Theory of Information Pricing
In the previous chapters we have shown that under an uncertain information-flow model we
can nevertheless derive asset price process, as well as associated derivatives, in closed form.
The way in which we have extended the original BHM model is motivated to some extent
by “realities” in financial markets concerning the fuzziness of the information flow rate.
If there is a high-quality information-extraction “device” (like a search engine), however,
the value of the information flow rate can be enhanced by means of an automated speedy
access to a large number of data sources.
This naturally leads to the question as regards the valuation of information itself! If an
information provider (but not an agent in financial markets) can extract information that
is useful for financial institutions, in which way should the provider fix its price? In this
chapter we shall be regarding information as a kind of “perishable” tradable asset (since
the lifetime of a useful information is typically short), and use an equilibrium argument
as a basis for pricing information itself. In particular, we shall be expressing information
in terms of its natural unit (the bit) and determine its price. We find what might be a
surprising result: that the cost of information is not necessarily monotonically increasing
in the quantity of information being supplied.
4.1 Introduction
The role and importance of information and its costing has long been recognised in the
economics literature [31]. Nowadays, people often obtain information through internet
search engines; but the very concept that one should search price information and utilise
it to reduce expenditure, in the context of commodity markets, has been noted for at least
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half a century [52], if not considerably longer.
Nevertheless, the use of information has never been as important in the past. Indeed, access
to internet search engines—whose objectives are in information provision—constitutes an
integrated part of the lives of hundreds of millions. Internet retailers likewise not only
sell products but also provide a range of information via their recommendation engines,
helping consumers find what they like but along the way also yielding additional profits.
The quality of a recommendation engine, however, is difficult to assess if one cannot assign
a value to the information it provides.
Rapid developments in communication technology have their upsides as well as downsides.
On the one hand, access to targeted information has been made easy (for example, when
one knows the relevant web address from which information can be obtained), while on the
other hand a generic search for specific information is becoming harder due to the flooding
of irrelevant information that constitutes noise. This is a phenomenon envisaged by Norbert
Wiener, who used the second law of thermodynamics to explain the fact that in the long run
one cannot overcome the impact of the noise that overwhelms useful information, and that
this effect is in part due to the advancements of communication technology [55]. Wiener
also recognised that this inevitable flow can locally be reversed by means of innovations. It
is for this reason that internet search engines and other information providers are constantly
on alert of innovative ideas for information extraction and provision. Evidently, enhance-
ment of information extraction and provision, and implementation of innovation, cannot be
realised without cost. As a consequence, access to valuable information will likewise entail
some costs. The question then is: how do we price information?
There is a form of information that is regarded as particularly valuable—the kind of infor-
mation that allows one to anticipate, at least with some statistical significance, what is to
come, that is, to anticipate future trends. For example, suppose that a company has just
released a new product. A search engine can access various internet sites and analyse texts
(e.g., blog articles and tweets) to determine how satisfied consumers are with the product.
If customer satisfaction is high, the search engine can anticipate that future sales will in-
crease and hence the company will perform well. Of course, neither the data source nor
the analysis can be perfect; nevertheless, if the methodology of information extraction is
adequate, then the prediction of the search engine can be statistically significant. After
a while, however, sales figures are released, by which time the value of this information
diminishes.
The above example illustrates the idea of information diffusion. The search engine extracts
information from in principle publicly available sources. Hence one need not be a large
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search engine to obtain the same information at the same time. However, in practice most
people do not have the resources to analyse in real time millions of articles available on
the internet. Nevertheless, after a sufficient amount of time (which can be short or long),
important information will be appreciated by a broad mass (and thus reflected in the share
price, in the above example), diminishing the worth of information as providing predic-
tive insights. At this stage, information has truly reached the public domain, but this is
necessarily sometime after its initial appearance somewhere in “public”.
From the viewpoint of a search or recommendation engine, and given their resources, ca-
pabilities, and objectives, therefore, it makes sense to extract useful information before the
public as a whole has had chance to do so, and sell it off to a third party who is in the
position to utilise this information. We can thus think of information as a tradable asset,
albeit that it will have an expiry date. In order to price information, however, we must cast
these intuitive ideas in terms of precise mathematical language.
4.2 Heuristic illustration
To illustrate how information can be valued, let us consider a simple example. Suppose
that we are interested in the price tomorrow of a stock, whose current price is s0. Our
formulation of information pricing is applicable to a broader class of situations involving
anticipation of uncertain future events. Nevertheless, we find that the example concern-
ing information for predicting the future market very convenient for providing an intuitive
understanding of the theory (cf. [12]). To keep the discussion simple, let us assume a
single-period setup so that the price s0 today will become the price s1 tomorrow. The value
of s1 is of course unknown today, but we assume that it satisfies a known probability law
p(x). That is, we regard s1 as a random variable defined on a probability space (Ω,F ,P),
where P denotes the physical probability measure. A search engine now performs text
mining to extract information relevant to determining the value of s1. Evidently, no search
engine is capable of identifying the value of s1; at best, it gathers noisy information in the
form of signal plus noise. In the simplest setup, s1 itself constitutes the signal, but a search
engine can only extract the value of
ξ = s1 + ², (4.1)
where ² represents noise, independent of s1, with known density f(x). In other words,
a search engine can sample the value of ξ, which contains new information that is not
already encoded in the valuation today of the stock, but not sufficient to determine the
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value tomorrow of the stock. With the knowledge of ξ the prior density p(x) of s1 can thus
be updated to the posterior density
π(x|ξ) = p(x)f(ξ − x)∫
dx p(x)f(ξ − x) (4.2)
in accordance with the Bayes formula. Writing πξ(x) = π(x|ξ) for the posterior density
we define the concept of information provision as follows: It is an operation that supplies
the updated probability law:
p(x) → πξ(x). (4.3)
Stated more precisely, information provision is an updating of probability law in the form
of (4.3) where πξ(x) is necessarily adapted to a larger filtration (i.e. information set or
knowledge) than that of p(x). Having defined the notion of information provision, we pro-
ceed to consider the pricing issues. Let us first illustrate the idea, and then try to formalise
it. In the above example, an uninformed investor will use the knowledge p(x) to deter-
mine the optimal asset allocation, which may contain a certain amount of stock, given the
initial budget W0. An informed investor is one who has purchased the knowledge πξ(x)
at a cost c and has used this knowledge to determine the optimal asset allocation, given a
smaller initial budget W0−c. For example, if the p-likelihood of the stock price going up is
high while the π-likelihood of this event is low, then the informed investor will purchase a
smaller amount of the stock so as to circumvent likely loss. The problem then is to identify
a fair value of the cost c. We would like to use a version of utility indifference argument
to determine the cost. However, as we shall indicate below, for information pricing, the
standard utility argument has to be augmented in a subtle manner so as to determine the
fair price. Let us illustrate this by means of a simple example.
4.2.1 Optimal portfolio choice for an uninformed investor
Consider a portfolio consisting of a single risky asset s0 and a risk-free money market
(bank) account. Let θ be the amount allocated to the money market account, and φ be the
unit of stock invested. Then starting with the initial wealth W0 we have the allocation
W0 = θ + φs0. (4.4)
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Let δ be the discount factor over the time period so that a unit cash invested in the money
market account will yield δ−1 at the end of the period. Then the terminal wealth becomes
W1 = θδ
−1 + φs1.
The uninformed investor will determine the optimal asset allocation strategy (θ∗, φ∗) such
that the expected utility Ep[U(W1)], with respect to a given choice of the utility function
U(x), of the terminal wealth, is maximised. Assume that s1 is a binary random variable tak-
ing values in the set {0, 1} with probabilities {p, 1−p}, and the investor has an exponential
utility
U(x) = 1− exp(−αx) α ∈ R+.
The utility describes the “happiness” or “satisfaction” of the investor in relation to monetary
gain. The computation of the expected utility is straightforward:
Ep[U(W1)] = 1− e−αδ−1(W0−φs0)
(
p + (1− p)e−αφ) ,
where we have eliminated θ by use of (4.4). Maximising this over φ and writing
sˉ0 = s0δ
−1
for the forwarded stock price, we obtain the following optimal asset allocation strategies:
φ∗ =
1
α
ln
[
(1− p)(1− sˉ0)
psˉ0
]
, θ∗ = W0 − φ∗s0. (4.5)
The optimal expected utility of terminal wealth is thus
u(W0) = 1− e−αδ−1(W0−φ∗s0)
(
p + (1− p)e−αφ∗) .
Note that the optimisation has been performed without constraints. If short selling of either
asset is forbidden, (θ∗, φ∗) are either (0, W0/s0) or (W0, 0) depending on whether φ∗ ≥
W0/s0 or φ
∗ < 0; otherwise, (θ∗, φ∗) are given by (4.5). Equivalently, these conditions can
be expressed in term of p in the sense that φ∗ is given by (4.5) if
1− sˉ0
sˉ0 exp(W0α/s0) + 1− sˉ0 ≤ p ≤ 1− sˉ0.
Otherwise, φ∗ = 0 or W0/s0.
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4.2.2 Optimal portfolio choice for informed investor
We now consider the action of an informed investor in this simple example. We assume
that there is an information provider who has the ability to sample
ξ = s1 + ²,
where ² is a noise term independent of s1, which for simplicity of exposition we assume to
take values {0, 1} with probabilities {q, 1− q}. In this example the value of ξ can be 0, 1,
or 2, and the a posteriori probability πξ that s1 = 0 is given by
π0 = 1,
π1 =
p(1− q)
p(1− q) + q(1− p) , (4.6)
π2 = 0.
Since the information provider has to have invested capital in developing a system that is
capable of sampling ξ (for example, in the form of a large number of computer servers),
and since it has to continue investments for system maintenance, it is only reasonable to
expect a payment for the provision of this information. Before we proceed to value this
cost, let us first examine the strategy of an informed investor.
Let c be the cost for the purchase of information. Then the initial budget condition for the
informed investor becomes
W0 = ϑ + ϕs0 + c, (4.7)
where (ϑ, ϕ) denote portfolio positions of the informed investor. An application of the
optimisation procedure described above then yields:
ϕ∗ =
1
α
ln
[
(1− πξ)(1− sˉ0)
πξsˉ0
]
, ϑ∗ = W0 − c− ϕ∗s0, (4.8)
where πξ = P(s1 = 0|ξ). In this case, the utility of the optimal terminal wealth conditional
on the value of ξ is given by
uc(W0) = 1− e−αδ−1(W0−c−ϕ∗s0)
(
πξ + (1− πξ)e−αϕ∗
)
. (4.9)
Similarly to the previous example, these results are based on unconstrained optimisation.
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If short selling is not permitted, for instance, then these results hold if
0 ≤ ϕ∗ ≤ (W0 − c)/s0.
Otherwise we must take appropriate boundary values.
4.3 Utility indifference pricing of information
We are now in a position to discuss the valuation of information in the above examples.
To this end we would like to employ an argument based on utility indifference, similar to
the one presented, for example, by Grossman and Stiglitz [28]. The argument intuitively
goes as follows. If possession of extra information at no cost provides on average a better
payoff, then every investor would seek to be informed. Consequently, there should be a
positive value assigned to this information. If on the other hand the price is too high, then
no one would want to be informed. Hence there exists an equilibrium level for the cost of
information at which investors are indifferent, as far as their preferences are concerned.
Naively, one might then identify the utility indifferent price of information by solving the
following equation for c:
u(W0) = uc(W0) (4.10)
so that the expected utility of the a posteriori optimal strategy after paying for the informa-
tion equals the utility of the a priori optimal strategy. The intuition behind this relation is as
follows: Provided that the cost c is sufficiently small, the possession of additional relevant
knowledge, in the form of a strictly larger filtration, necessarily increases expected utility.
Since utility is a decreasing function of the cost c, there must be a positive number c∗ such
that (4.10) is satisfied for c = c∗.
In the context of information pricing, however, this intuitive argument fails to determine the
correct value of c∗. On further reflection, the reason for this becomes apparent: ignorance
can make people happy. While it is true that with the additional knowledge an investor will
on average perform better (cf. [13]), an uninformed investor can be more optimistic about
the future outlook.
Take, for instance, an extreme case where the a priori probability that the stock price mov-
ing up by a significant amount is high. An uninformed investor will thus put the majority of
the initial wealth into purchasing this stock. Suppose, however, that the a posteriori proba-
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bility indicates that the stock price is more likely to move down. An informed investor will
thus only invest a small fraction of the initial wealth into this stock to avoid a large loss. In
this case, a likely scenario is that an informed investor knows that there is little prospect of
making a large profit (i.e. small expected utility), but manages to prevent a loss, while an
uninformed investor has a very high hope (i.e. large expected utility), but ending up with
a loss. According to the pricing formula (4.10), therefore, the information cost becomes
negative in such a scenario.
Grossman and Stiglitz [28] (see also [40, 45, 53]), on the other hand, propose the use of the
following identity to fix the cost:
Ep[U(W ∗p )] = Ep[U(W ∗π,c)]. (4.11)
Here, W ∗p = θ∗δ−1 +φ∗s1 denotes the random variable associated with the terminal wealth
based on the implementation of the a priori optimal strategy (4.5); whereas the second
wealth W ∗π,c = ϑ∗δ−1 + ϕ∗s1 denotes the random variable associated with the terminal
wealth based on the implementation of the a posteriori optimal strategy (4.8), having paid
c for the information. This is likewise the pricing formula proposed by Amendinger et al.
[3] (see also [5]). In the present example, (4.11) leads to the pricing formula
c∗GS =
δ
α
ln
[
1
qsˉ0(1− q)1−sˉ0
]
. (4.12)
The shortcoming of the Grossman-Stiglitz pricing formula (4.11), however, is that the cost
is fixed irrespective of its quality. For example, if the realised value of ξ is either 0 or 2,
and if there is no cap on short selling, then an investor can purchase this information for a
modest cost to make infinite profit, leading to an arbitrage because starting with zero initial
wealth W0 = 0 one can construct a portfolio such that E[W1] = ∞ under any measure
equivalent to P. In contrast, in our theory we would like the cost of information be infinite,
if this information were to provide infinite benefit. (See also remarks in Appendix A).
4.4 Information dependent price
With this in mind, we deduce that the “correct” pricing formula should be given by solving
Eπ[U(W ∗p )] = Eπ[U(W ∗π,c)] (4.13)
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Figure 4.1: Left: Expected utilities Eπ[U(W ∗p )] for ξ = 0, 1, 2 as a function of the cost c
are shown here as three horizontal lines. For each value of ξ we also plot Eπ[U(W ∗π,c)],
when short selling is strictly prohibited. When c is sufficiently small, the latter utilities are
higher, but as the cost increases, they decrease. At c = c∗ the two utility functions for each
ξ agree and determine the unique equilibrium price for which the investor is indifferent.
Here we have chosen parameters to be α = 0.1, s0 = 0.5, W0 = 5, p = 0.4, q = 0.7, and
δ = 0.95. The numerical values for the cost for each ξ are plotted as a histogram on the
right side. In this example, we have c∗(0) = 1.51, c∗(1) = 0.71, and c∗(2) = 1.65. The
average cost is cˉ∗ = 1.10.
for c. In other words, we consider with hindsight what would have happened to the un-
informed strategy, and compare this with the informed strategy. In this way, a consistent
price for information can be deduced. We propose this to be the basis with which informa-
tion can be priced using a utility indifference argument. In the case of the above example,
(4.13) amounts to solving
e−αδ
−1(W0−φ∗s0) (πξ + (1− πξ)e−αφ∗) = e−αδ−1(W0−c−ϕ∗s0) (πξ + (1− πξ)e−αϕ∗)
for c. This gives
c∗ =
δ
α
ln
[
πξe
αsˉ0φ∗ + (1− πξ)eαφ∗(sˉ0−1)
πξeαsˉ0ϕ
∗ + (1− πξ)eαϕ∗(sˉ0−1)
]
,
which makes it apparent that when φ∗ = ϕ∗, i.e. when ξ provides no additional information
(which can happen in the present example if for instance p = q = 1
2
and ξ = 1), or when
the additional information provided by ξ results in no change of the strategy, the cost is
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identically zero. Note that the dependence of πξ on ξ implies that the value of c∗ also
depends on ξ. Thus, for instance if ξ = 0 or ξ = 2, and if unlimited short selling is
allowed, then c∗ = ∞ as desired. In many cases the dependence on ξ is natural, because
different values of ξ embody different information contents.
The plot for cost versus information content in figure 4.1 shows the indifference price of
information for different values of ξ. It is given by the value of c where the two curves of
uninformed and informed expected utilities meet. If the cost were higher then this would
be favourable to the information provider, while if the cost were lower this would be more
favourable to the information seeker. The lowest cost is at ξ = 1, where the corresponding
pairs (ST , ²) take the values {0, 1} or {1, 0}. It is where the uncertainties are the highest as
compared to other values of ξ. Indeed, this is the only case of uncertainty in our example.
In contrast to the informational cost formula proposed by Grossman and Stiglitz, the one
that we proposed is that of no arbitrage. This can be shown by the fact that the wealth
process, W ∗π,c, is a martingale (see Appendix A for detail calculation). In particular, the
unconditional expectation of the terminal wealth is a constant under the P measure:
E[W ∗π,c] = B(ϕ∗1)− A(ϕ∗1)/α + φ∗((1− p)(1− q)(1− sˉ0)− pqsˉ0).
whereA(ϕ∗1), B(ϕ∗1) are constants defined in Appendix A. Hence one can find an equivalent
martingale measure Q such that
EQ[W ∗π,c] = W0,
and this implies no arbitrage.
4.5 Information independent price
While it is useful to be able to express the cost c∗(ξ) as a function of the “content” ξ of
the information, there are likewise cases where it is desirable to associate a fixed price
for information. This applies to the provision of generic information; whereas for the
purchase of a specialised information, it might be unreasonable to expect a flat rate for the
information, irrespective of its content or quality. We shall therefore consider both cases.
If short selling is prohibited, then even with the knowledge ξ = 0 or ξ = 2 an investor can
only make a finite profit. Hence in this case the cost should also be strictly bounded. In fig-
ure 4.1 on the left panel we plot Eπ[U(W ∗p )] for three values of ξ as functions of c (clearly,
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Eπ[U(W ∗p )] for each value of ξ is constant in c), and compared these with Eπ[U(W ∗π,c)] as
functions of c, when short selling is forbidden. For each value of ξ the intersection of the
two functions determines the cost c∗(ξ), shown as a histogram also in figure 4.1. For the
parameter values chosen in this example, the “upside” information (when ξ = 2) is worth
a little more than the “downside” information (when ξ = 0). In this way we are able to
assign prices for information of specific quality. If we are interested in assigning a flat rate
cˉ∗, then we average the individual cost according to
cˉ∗ =
∑
k
P(ξ = ξk)c∗(ξk).
In the present example we have
P(ξ = 0) = pq,
P(ξ = 1) = p(1− q) + (1− p)q, and
P(ξ = 2) = (1− p)(1− q),
which can be used to determine cˉ∗. Since the a priori expectation of our pricing formula
(4.13) gives the Grossman-Stiglitz formula (4.11), we see that solutions to (4.11) and (4.13)
correspond, respectively, to the concepts of an annealed average and a quenched average
often considered in the spin-glass theory. In particular, by an application of Jensen’s in-
equality, the Grossman-Stiglitz cost provides a lower bound for our cost:
c∗GS ≤ cˉ∗.
4.6 Separation of density functions
The informed investor has purchased extra information, putting him in a better position
when choosing his assets. One way of quantifying the “gap” between the uninformed
and the informed information is to express their separation in terms of the Bhattacharyya
spherical distance between p and π. The Bhattacharyya spherical distance between two
probabilities {pi} and {qi} for i = {1, . . . , N} is given by
DB(p|q) = cos−1
N∑
i=1
√
pi
√
qi.
Intuitively, the idea of the Bhattacharyya spherical distance can be understood by regarding
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{√pi} and {√qi} as representing normalised vectors in the Hilbert space H = l2. Then
0 ≤ DB ≤ π/2 can be seen to represent the angular separation between the two vectors in
the Hilbert spaceH.
In figure 4.2 we plot the Bhattacharyya spherical distance DB(p, πξ) for three different
realised values of ξ, as a function of the prior probability p. From these distance plots
we can deduce how much the posterior probability deviates from the prior probability in
different circumstances. In particular, values of DB(p, πξ) are large when the additional
information comes as a significant surprise.
Figure 4.2: The Bhattacharyya spherical distance between p and π for difference values of
ξ (the left top curve corresponds to ξ = 0, left middle to ξ = 2, and left bottom to ξ = 1).
The horizontal axis represents different values of p.
4.7 Utility indifference information pricing with continuous payoff
Having introduced our framework for information pricing, our next objective is to express
the cost in terms of the quantity of information so that we are able to quote the price in
the form, for example: “$X for Y bits of upside information”. This is highly desirable
because the representation of the cost as a function of ξ need not be very practical. Our
definition of information as a quantity that generates the transformation (4.3) allows us to
proceed by the consideration of relative entropy between the a priori and the a posteriori
probabilities. The examples considered above, however, are too restrictive, because the a
priori and the a posteriori probabilities are not absolutely continuous with respect to each
other, and thus relative entropy cannot be defined. Indeed, the idea that an information
provider can ascertain the future value s1 at time 0, which would be the case if the sampled
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value of ξ is either 0 or 2, is somewhat artificial and unrealistic. We therefore consider
another simple example in which this issue does not arise.
We assume the setup as before, except that the random variable s1 is assumed normally
distributed with mean μ and variance σ2:
ξ = s1 + ², where s1 ∼ N(μ, σ), ² ∼ N(0, σ²).
Thus, the model is similar to the Bachelier model, rather than a geometric Gaussian model,
in that the asset price can take negative values. In the case of an uninformed investor, a
straightforward Gaussian integration then gives the expected utility of terminal wealth as:
Ep[U(W1)] = 1− exp
[−α (δ−1(W0 − φs0) + φμ− 12αφ2σ2)] .
It follows that the optimal allocation strategy is determined by
φ∗ =
μ− sˉ0
ασ2
, θ∗ = W0 − (μ− sˉ0)s0
ασ2
.
Similarly to the previous example, if there is a restriction on short selling, then these results
hold provided that 0 ≤ φ∗ ≤ W0/s0; otherwise, φ∗ = 0 or φ∗ = W0/s0.
An informed investor is able to purchase the sampled value of ξ given by (4.1) above, except
that the noise variable ² is now assumed normally distributed with mean zero and variance
σ2² . In this case, a standard result in Gaussian filtering theory [54] (in fact, a straightforward
application of the Bayes formula) shows that the a posteriori probability law for s1 given ξ
is also normally distributed:
s1|ξ ∼ N
(
μσ2² + ξσ
2
σ2² + σ
2
,
√
σ2σ2²
σ2 + σ2²
)
≡ N(μξ, σξ).
The optimisation problem thus reduces to maximising
uc(W0) = 1− exp
(−α (δ−1(W0 − c− ϕs0) + ϕμξ − 12αϕ2σ2ξ)) .
The result is
ϕ∗ =
μξ − sˉ0
ασ2ξ
, ϑ∗ = W0 − c− (μξ − sˉ0)s0
ασ2ξ
. (4.14)
As before, if short selling is not permitted, we have the conditions 0 ≤ ϕ∗ ≤ (W0 − c)/s0
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Figure 4.3: Left: Cost c∗(ξ) of information as a function of the realised value of ξ. Right:
Relative entropy I(ξ) = I(πξ|p) as a function of the realised value of ξ. The parameter
values used here are: s0 = 1, δ = 0.95, α = 0.1, W0 = 10, μ = 1.1, σ2 = 0.2, μ² = 0,
and σ2² = 0.2. The red curves correspond to pieces of downside information (i.e., values of
ξ that indicate decrease in s1 as compared to the a priori expectation) and the blue curves
correspond to upside information.
for which (4.14) is valid; otherwise we must take boundary values.
Let us evaluate the cost of information by the principle (4.13). This amounts to finding the
value for c that solves
exp
[−α ((W0 − φ∗s0)δ−1 + φ∗μξ − 12αφ∗2σ2ξ)]
= exp
[−α ((W0 − c− ϕ∗s0)δ−1 + ϕ∗μξ − 12αϕ∗2σ2ξ)] ,
with the solution
c∗ = 1
2
αδσ2ξ (φ
∗ − ϕ∗)2. (4.15)
This provides the cost c∗(ξ) as a function of the sampled value of ξ. That is, before the
purchase is made, a client of the information provider can agree to the price structure
(4.15) so that depending on which value of ξ the information provider produces, the client
will pay the cost appropriate for that information. If the use of a flat rate cˉ∗ for the cost is
desirable, then we average c∗(ξ) over ξ under the suitable Gaussian measure for ξ. This is
given by the expression
cˉ∗ =
1
2α
δσ2ξ
[
(μ− sˉ0)2
(
σ−2 − σ−2ξ
)2
+
σ2
σ2ξσ
2
²
]
.
It is interesting to draw attention to the expression (4.15) we have obtained for the cost. Up
to a proportionality factor, the cost is given by the quadratic difference between the a priori
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Figure 4.4: The cost c∗(I) as a function of the quantity of information I , when there is
no constraint for short selling. The solid lines in all four plots (they are identical) corre-
spond to the parameter values used in figure 4.3. While keeping other parameters fixed, the
following changes in parameter values are used, represented by dashed lines in the plots.
Top left: α has been increased to α = 0.2; top right: σ2 has been increased to σ2 = 0.4;
bottom left: σ2² has been increased to σ2² = 0.4; and bottom right: δ has been decreased
to δ = 0.92. The red curves correspond to downside information, and the blue curves
correspond to upside information.
and the a posteriori portfolio positions. This indicates that the cost is indeed determined
by the “usefulness” of information. We shall come to discuss further on this point below.
As indicated above, we wish to associate the cost with the quantity of information. For this
purpose, we consider the relative entropy
I(πξ|p) =
∫ ∞
−∞
πξ(s) ln
(
πξ(s)
p(s)
)
ds
= 1
2
[
ln
(
σ2
σ2ξ
)
+
σ2ξ
σ2
− 1
]
+ 1
2
(μξ − μ)2
σ2
(4.16)
between the prior and the posterior densities. It should be evident from the decomposition
ξ = s1 + ² that there is a critical value ξ†, given by the a prior expectation of s1, such that
the a posteriori density is least informative, and such that the information content increases
as the value of ξ increases or decreases away from this critical level. In other words, relative
entropy is monotonically decreasing in ξ if ξ < ξ†, and monotonically increasing in ξ if
ξ ≥ ξ†. One might therefore expect that the cost should also exhibit the same monotonic
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Figure 4.5: Left: Cost c∗(ξ) of information as a function of the realised value of ξ when
short selling is strictly prohibited. Right: Relative entropy I(ξ) = I(πξ|p) as a function
of the realised value of ξ. The cost c∗(ξ) measures the usefulness of information, while
relative entropy I(ξ) measures the quantity of information. The parameter values used here
are: s0 = 1, δ = 0.95, α = 0.1, W0 = 10, μ = 1.1, σ
2 = 0.2, μ² = 0, and σ2² = 0.2.
The red curves correspond to pieces of downside information (i.e. values of ξ that indicate
decrease in s1 as compared to the a priori expectation) and the blue curves correspond to
upside information.
dependence on |ξ− ξ†|. Surprisingly, however, this is not the case. As indicated above, the
pricing formula (4.15) in the Gaussian model shows that if the additional information does
not alter portfolio positions, then an investor is not going to pay for that information. As a
consequence, minimum information can be more costly (i.e. useful) than a larger quantity
of information.
In figure 4.3 we plot the cost function c∗(ξ) where there are no constraints for short sell-
ing, and the relative entropy I(ξ). By inverting these two functions we can determine the
cost c∗(I) as a function of the information content, as shown in figure 4.4 for a range of
parameter values. Note that in the numerical plots we have converted the logarithmic basis
so that relative entropy I is measured in the conventional binary units of “bits” rather than
the Shannon units used in (4.16). Hence the horizontal axis represents information content
expressed in binary units.
4.7.1 Unconstrained scenario
We observe that costs of upside information in these examples are always slightly higher
than those of downside information, and that in each case the cost is approximately a linear
function of the quantity of information. The general trend that we have found is as follows.
The cost in the unconstrained case is a decreasing function of the risk aversion parameter
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α in the utility function. This is because for a high value of α the investor “saturates” the
upper bound of the utility function sooner, as compared to a lower value of α; hence the
investor reaches a “happy” or “satisfied” level, and any further monetary gain will only add
little value. In other word, a high α investor is an investor of a risk-averse type.
The cost is an increasing function of the signal uncertainty σ. This is natural, because
if one has a very noisy signal to start with, then a better-quality additional information
becomes more valuable. However, if one is a priori clear about the realised value of s1
then additional news seems less attractive.
The cost is a decreasing function of the noise uncertainty σ². That is, the stronger the noise
contained in the information is, the less valuable the information becomes. This is entirely
expected, since the reliability of the information is clearly decreasing in the width σ² of the
noise.
Finally, the cost is a slightly increasing function of the discount factor δ, which again seems
natural because the growth of the money market account is given by δ−1.
4.7.2 Constrained scenario
The cost structure changes somewhat if we restrict short selling. This is because the upside
gain from exploiting additional information is restricted in this case. In particular, if short
selling (including cash borrowing) is prohibited, then the cost is bounded above by the
initial wealth W0.
We plot in figure 4.5 the cost c∗(ξ) as a function of ξ in the case for which short selling is
strictly forbidden. The result reveals some interesting insights: a client of an information
provider is willing to pay significantly higher costs for large downside information, as
compared to upside information, and the increase in c∗(ξ) for upside information is satiated
relatively early.
This feature of course is closely related to the model setup chosen here: Since s1 is assumed
Gaussian, purchase of the stock by any amount can result in an unbounded loss. Therefore,
investors are willing to spend the totality W0 of the initial budget as a protection against
large losses, leaving behind no asset for any investment. Conversely, investors are inclined
not to spend significant portions of the initial budget on upside information, because if there
are opportunities to profit from investments, they would not want to lose these opportunities
by spending all the budgets. This is a remarkable feature inherited from the utility function,
in which the gradient decreases as we go up the x axis.
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Figure 4.6: The cost c∗(I) as a function of the quantity of information I , when short selling
is strictly prohibited. The solid lines in all four plots (they are identical) correspond to the
parameter values used in figure 4.5. While keeping other parameters fixed, the following
changes in parameter values are used, represented by dashed lines in the plots. Top left: α
has been increased to α = 0.2; top right: σ2 has been increased to σ2 = 0.4; bottom left: σ2²
has been increased to σ2² = 0.4; and bottom right: δ has been decreased to δ = 0.92. The
red curves correspond to downside information, and the blue curves correspond to upside
information.
Although the cost structure changes when there are constraints, we can again invert these
relations to quote unique prices for upside and downside information. The results are shown
in figure 4.6 for a range of parameter values. We observe that when there are constraints
the price of information exhibits somewhat nontrivial behaviour as we change the model
parameters.
One noticeable behaviour seen across all constrained prices is that downside information
has sharper gradients than upside news. This reflects the fact that as we move down the
utility curve from any particular point we have sharper changes in its gradient. Therefore,
investors with such utility are always willing to pay a higher cost for negative news than
positive ones of the same magnitude, when measured in bits.
Generally, the cost for downside information decreases and upside information increases
as we increase the risk aversion parameter α. The reason for this is because, with a high
α value the utility of the investor would already be at a higher values, as compared to
a low α investor, referenced at the same fixed wealth. As wealth decreases, the high α
investor would remain content initially, hence not yet ready to pay a high cost for the
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Figure 4.7: Interpolation of the information price c∗(I) from the strictly constrained case
to the unconstrained case. Top row, from left: (i) borrowing is strictly forbidden; (ii)
borrowing is capped at W0/2; (iii) borrowing is capped at W0. Bottom row, from left: (i)
borrowing is capped at 2W0; (ii) borrowing is capped at 5W0; (iii) unlimited borrowing
permitted.
downside information. Whereas for a low α investor, she may enter the “unhappy” level
faster, and thus is willing to pay a higher cost to compensate the potential loss. For the
upside information, a high α investor has the steeper gradient, hence is willing to pay more.
The effect does not appear on the downside because we restrained from short selling, so a
negative information does not help the investor to increase utility significantly, but only to
limit the loss.
As the signal uncertainty σ increases, the cost for downside information becomes less ex-
pensive while upside news become more expensive. That upside news become more ex-
pensive is because the investor is willing to pay more for a clearer signal to profit more.
For downside news, on the other hand, the worth of information seems to diminish rapidly
as the signal uncertainty is increased. These two features are not symmetric because in this
constrained case where no short selling is permitted, the investor cannot profit from down-
side news, but can only limit losses, whereas the investor can profit from upside news.
The bottom left plot in figure 4.6 has varying levels of noise variance, this includes the
cases of σ² = {0.1, 0.2, 0.4}. The graphs are identical in all of the cases. The idea is that
the noisier the piece of information is, the less one is willing to pay and vice versa. This is
because an information with large noise gives less information as measured by the relative
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entropy, and this in turn gives less bits to be paid for. If we know that a piece of information
is noisy than this does not affect our decision, only that we know it is not very informative
and we pay less.
The two cases examined here, namely, the strictly constrained and totally unconstrained
cases, can be interpolated by gradually relaxing the borrowing cap, as shown in figure 4.7.
These intermediate cases are often more realistic because of leveraging. In the case of the
example considered here we observe that by raising the cap of borrowing to five times the
total wealth the net effect is already equivalent to allowing for unlimited borrowing. The
effect of leveraging is also of interest in showing in which way the upside and downside
information costs intertwine.
4.8 Analysis of expected loss at maximum information cost
One interesting observation that we have made in the case where there are trading con-
straints on short selling is that for a sufficiently strong indication that the price may drop
significantly, investors are willing to spend the totality of their initial wealth to purchase
such information so as to avoid large losses. In this case, no upside gain will be made;
instead, all the asset is consumed to prevent large losses. A natural question that arises
then is: what is the amount of expected loss, as a percentage of the initial wealth, such that
investors are willing to trade their entire asset in exchange for the information so that no
asset is left for further investment? To address this interesting question, let us denote by ξ∗
the critical value of information ξ such that c∗(ξ∗) = W0. Then the conditional expected
loss is given by
W0 − E[WT |ξ = ξ∗] = W0(1− exp(rT )) + φ∗(μξ∗ − sˉ0),
where φ∗ is the optimal risky asset allocation with no short selling. The standard deviation
of the conditional loss is similarly given by
(Var[WT |ξ = ξ∗])1/2 = φ∗σξ∗ .
We have calculated the conditional expected loss and the associated standard deviation for
a range of parameter values, expressed in percentage of the initial wealth W0. The result is
given in Table 4.1 below.
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α α = 0.1 s0 = 10,
0.1 0.3 0.5 W0 = 100 W0 = 100
Expected loss (%) 99.67 99.85 99.89 99.94 99.67
Standard deviation of loss (%) 7.7 2.58 1.54 0.77 2.43
Table 4.1 A table showing the expected loss in percentage of the initial wealth for a
range of parameter values. The parameter values being used here are r = 5%, T = 1,
α = 0.1, σ = 0.2, μ = 1.1, σ² = 0.2, and μ² = 0. The values of the initial wealth are
W0 = 10 and W0 = 100, as indicated in the table, and the value of the initial asset is
s0 = 1, unless otherwise specified.
Since the terminal value of the risky asset is normally distributed in the present example,
an investor purchasing the asset is in effect entering into a contract that entails unbounded
gain, but also unbounded loss. This is precisely why when short selling is not permitted
an investor would rather spend the totality of the initial wealth to purchase the information
so that investment opportunities are lost, provided that the a posteriori expected loss is
greater than a threshold value. The results of Table 4.1 show that this threshold is about
100% of the initial wealth, irrespective of the model parameters. It is interesting that the
the expected loss turns out to be more or less exactly the initial wealth.
4.9 Cost of information in continuous time
It is of interest to extend the single-period models considered previously to continuous-
time models within the context of utility indifference pricing theory. In this section we
shall generalise the method we presented in the previous section to a dynamical, contin-
uous time setting. The scenario of receiving an extra noisy information falls under the
context of “filtration enlargement” in the literature. We shall follow existing literature of
filtration enlargement techniques, specifically, Amendinger et al. [3], and employ the stan-
dard portfolio optimisation procedure using the concept of convex duality [44, 46] to work
out the cost of information through the augmented utility indifferent price framework.
4.9.1 Utility optimisation
We begin by reviewing the theory of utility-based portfolio pricing in incomplete markets
using the convex duality method. This method has been widely studied and developed in
the literature; to name a few, references [18, 19, 37, 39, 44, 46] and many others since
the 1980s. This section follows, in particular, the setting of [44, 46]. In what follows, we
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present some results on information cost in continuous time; background material regarding
filtration enlargement and utility optimisation are presented in Appendices B and C. We
refer readers to these appendices and references for detailed arguments.
We shall not assume market completeness. Incomplete markets are usually associated with
the notion of perfect hedgeability, i.e. whether a contingent claim can be replicated per-
fectly. We consider the incomplete market in the sense of insufficient information regarding
the dynamics of the asset. This would lead to models of stochastic volatility and uncertain
drift, because there are extra randomness or uncertainty in the asset. Consequently, the
market is inefficient, in the sense that information flow is not perfect and hence not all
information available in the market are taken into account by every participant. Extra in-
formation can nevertheless be acquired by extra costs.
In this section, we assume the setup, as described in the BHM information framework
[17], whereby the asset price process is adapted to the filtration generated by a market
information process {ξt}, and that the drift and volatility are deterministic given ξt. Hence
the background filtration is given by Ft = σ(ξs : 0 ≤ s ≤ t). The time set is denoted by
T = [0, T ].
There are n + 1 assets, one money market account S0t and n risky assets (S1, ..., Sn).
Assume that the dynamics of the assets take the form:
dSit = μ
i
tS
i
tdt + σ
i
tS
i
tdWt, (4.17)
where {Wt} is a d-dimensional Brownian motion on (Ω,F , {Ft},P) and d ≥ n. To sim-
plify the notation we shall write dS = dSi, and similarly for {μt} and {σt}. The processes
{μt}, {σt} are progressively measurable processes in Rn and Rn×d with the property that∫ T
0
|μt|dt +
∫ T
0
|σt|2dt < ∞
almost surely. We assume that for all t ∈ [0, T ], and the matrix σt is of rank n. Thus the
matrix σtσTt of dimension n×n is invertible. The money market account with deterministic
interest rate {rt} is given by
S0t = exp
(∫ t
0
rsds
)
.
For the requirement of no arbitrage, we assume that the set Me of equivalent martingale
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measures associated with the asset is nonempty:
Me(S) 6= ∅.
If the setMe(S) contains only one element then evidently the market is complete. (Further
details about the no arbitrage condition can be found in Appendix C.1.)
Now a self-financing portfolio is defined by a pair {w, φt}wherew ∈ R is the initial wealth
and φt = {φit}i=1,...,d is a predictable and S-integrable vector of processes specifying the
number of shares of each of the risky assets held in the portfolio. The value of the self-
financing portfolio at time t is given by:
Wt := w +
∫ t
0
φudSu =: w + (φ ∙ S)t,
where
∫
φdS ≡ ∑n ∫ φidSi. Knowing the “control process” {φt} is similar to knowing
the wealth process {Wt}. If {St} is a local-martingale then {Wt} is known to be a sigma-
martingale.
As in the previous section, we consider a utility function of the form
U(x) = −e−αx, (4.18)
where α is the risk aversion rate; large values of α correspond to high risk aversion. The
exponential utility function is strictly concave and satisfies the Inada conditions:
U ′(0) := lim
x↓0
U ′(x) = ∞, and U ′(∞) := lim
x→∞
U ′(x) = 0.
Our aim now is to solve the optimisation problem
u(w) := sup
φ∈A
E[U(WT )] = sup
φ∈A
EU
(
w +
∫ T
0
φtdSˉt
)
, (4.19)
where
Sˉt = St exp(−
∫ t
0
rsds)
is the discounted price and the admissible set of strategies is defined as
A = {φ : (φ ∙ S) is a Q-martingale ∀ Q ∈Me}.
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We aim to use convex optimisation techniques to solve the problem described by equation
(4.19). We shall only summarise here important steps in solving the primal problem (4.19);
further details are provided in appendix C.2. By Fenchel-Legendre transform, we obtain
the conjugate relation
V (y) := sup
x∈R+
[U(x)− xy], y > 0,
and
U(x) = inf
y>0
[V (y) + xy], x > 0.
In other word, the solution to the primal problem can be deduced by solving the dual
problem:
v(y) := inf
Q∈Me
EV [(yZT )], (4.20)
where ZT is the Radon-Nikodym derivative ofQ with respect to P. In this formulation, the
optimal asset allocation strategy is given by (Appendix C):
φ∗t Sˉt =
1
α
σt(σtσ
T
t )
−1σt(σtσTt )
−1(μt − rt1). (4.21)
The primal value function can be derived at once to be
u(w) = − exp (−αw −H(QE,P)) .
The so-called maximum entropy has the following form:
H(QE,P) = 1
2
∫ T
0
|λt|2dt.
4.9.2 Utility optimisation with information
The effect of new information ξ is reflected through the enlargement of filtration, the new
probability space is now (Ω,F∨G,G = {Gt},P)where G = σ(ξ) and Gt = Ft∨G. Follow-
ing the line of arguments presented in Amendinger et al. we shall employ the martingale
preserving measure Q˜ such that Q˜ = P on G and Q˜ = Q on FT , where ZGT = ZFT /pG
is its Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to P. The key property of the measure Q˜ is
that Ft-martingale remains martingale under Ft ∨ G. Further details about the martingale
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preserving measure are given in Appendix B.
For an investor to obtain information {ξt} adapted to a larger filtration, it will naturally
entail a cost c. The new portfolio and value function are defined as
uG(w − c) := sup
ϕ∈AG
EP
[
U
(
w +
∫ T
0
ϕtdSˉt − c
)∣∣∣∣Gt] .
The admissible set of strategies AG in this case is defined by a set of integrable strategies
such that
AG = {ϕ : (ϕ, Sˉ)t is a Q˜-martingale under G}.
For informed investors, we have the new definition of equivalent martingale measures:
MGe = {Q v P on (Ω,GT ) : discounted price of S is a Q˜-local martingale}.
We can follow the same argument as for the uninformed case and derive the relative entropy
for the informed investor. If we denote by EG[∙] the risk-neutral expectation under G, and
using the properties that this defines the minimal martingale preserving measure Q˜E:
HG(Q˜E,P) = E
[
dQ˜E
dP
ln
dQ˜E
dP
∣∣∣∣∣Gt
]
= EG
[
ln ZGT |Gt
]
= EG
[
ln
ZGT
ZT
+ ln ZT
∣∣∣∣Gt]
= EG
[
ln
ZGT
ZT
∣∣∣∣Gt]+ E[ZT ln ZT ].
The minimal change-of-measure martingale is given by
ZGT =
dQ˜E
dP
=
1
pG
exp
(
−
∫ T
0
λtdWt − 1
2
∫ T
0
|λt|2dt
)
.
This gives a different initial wealth
w = W0 =
1
α
(
E
[
ln
αpG
y
∣∣∣∣Gt]− 12
∫ T
0
|λt|2dt
)
.
Though the running strategy is unchanged if we have a deterministic λt, which is given by
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equation (4.21). The dual variable y is given by
y∗ = α exp
(
−αw −HG(Q˜E,P)
)
,
which gives the value function for the informed investor
uG(w − c) = − exp (−α(w − c)−H(QE,P))EG [exp(−EG [ ln ZGT
ZT
∣∣∣∣Gt]) |Gt] ,
where Q˜E ∈MGe is the minimal entropic martingale preserving measure for the informed.
For an uninformed investor taking the posterior expectation, the value function is defined
by
uG(w) := sup
φ∈A
E [U(WT )|Gt]
= −e−αwE[exp(−α(w + 1/α[H(QE,P)− EQ[ln ZT |Ft]]))|Gt]
= −e−αwE[ZT exp(−H(QE,P))|Gt]
= −e−αw−H(QE ,P),
due to the martingale preserving property.
We follow the argument of indifferent pricing as shown in equation (4.13) :
uG(w∗) = uG(w − c) (4.22)
where w∗ is the optimal initial wealth under F. The cost c can be deduced at once
c∗ = − 1
α
lnEG
[
exp
(
−EG
[
ln
ZGT
ZT
∣∣∣∣Gt])∣∣∣∣Gt] . (4.23)
Remark: Since we are taking conditional expectation on the relative entropy that depends
on Gt, the cost will as a consequence depend on Gt, that is, on the outcome of the random
variable ξt.
4.10 Cost for extra noisy information
We are interested in analysing the gain of information from the update of information.
Specifically, following from chapter 2, an aggregate of information processes can be repre-
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sented in a form of one single effective information process. Hence we assume that
Gt = Ft ∨ (Ht = σ(ηt, 0 ≤ s ≤ t)).
The additional information ξt is given in the form of signal plus noise
ηt = νYT t + βtT (4.24)
where {βtT} is a Brownian bridge; ν is a random variable denoting the information flow
rate and YT a random variable denoting the future cash flow, independent of βtT and ν. Due
to proposition B.1.5 and the Markovian property of this information process, the relative
entropy can be written as
E
[
ZGT ln
ZT
ZGT
∣∣∣∣Ht] = E[ZGT ln pG|ηt]. (4.25)
Furthermore, the a posteriori distribution given Gt of YT is given by:
pG =
1√
2πt(T − t)/T exp
(
−1
2
(ηt − νYT t)2
t(T − t)/T
)
.
The entropy function in equation (4.25) becomes:
E[ZGT ln pG|ξ] =
1
2
(
ln
T
2πt(T − t) −
EG[(ηt − νYT t)2|ηt]
t(T − t)/T
)
=
1
2
(
ln
T
2πt(T − t) −
η2t +
∫
(vyt)2π(y|ηt)dy − 2ηt
∫
vytπ(y|ηt)dy
t(T − t)/T
)
. (4.26)
In the first equality, we have used the martingale preserving property that
EG[(ηt − νYT t)2|ηt] = EQ[(x− νYT t)2]|x=ηt .
By employing the Bayesian method, as shown in chapters 2, one can derive the a posterior
distribution π(x|ηt) explicitly:
π(y|ηt) =
∫
π(y, v|ηt)dv =
∫
p(y)p(v) exp
[
T
T−t
(
yvηt − 12y2v2t
)]
dv∫ ∫
p(y)p(v) exp
[
T
T−t
(
yvηt − 12y2v2t
)]
dvdy
.
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Hence if we exponentiate (4.26) and take the conditional expectation under the enlarged
filtration, we obtain
EG[eE[ZGT ln pG|η]|ηt]
= EG
[√
T
2πt(T − t) exp
(
− 1
2
(
ηt −
∫
vytπηdy
)2
t(T − t)/T
)∣∣∣∣∣ ηt
]
∙
exp
(
− Tt
2(T − t)Var(νYT|ηt)
)
=
√
T
2πt(T − t) exp
(
− 1
2
(
ηt −
∫
vytπηdy
)2
t(T − t)/T
)
∙
exp
(
− Tt
2(T − t)Var(νYT|ηt)
)
. (4.27)
Hence the cost depends on the a posterior mean and variance of the cash flow, denoted by
μνYT |η and σ2νYT |η respectively:
c∗t =
1
α
[
ln
(
2πt(T − t)
T
)
+
T (ηt − μνYT |η)2
2t(T − t)) +
Ttσ2νYT |ξt
2(T − t)
]
. (4.28)
We observe similar behaviour in this function as in the one-period setting in the previous
section. In particular, the cost is an increasing function of the “degree of surprise”, i.e. the
a posterior variance σ2νYT |ξt .
4.11 Discussion
In summary, we have modified the conventional approach to information pricing so as to
obtain a pricing structure for information so that the pre-agreed price of information de-
pends on the quality of information provided. This is reasonable because it is difficult
for an information provider in reality to ensure the quality of information, on account of
noise. One of the consequences is that the behaviour of the information cost is very dif-
ferent for the constrained and unconstrained scenarios. The main difference between the
two scenarios is that when short selling is not allowed in the constrained case, downside
information can only alert investors concerning possible losses (i.e. one cannot make profit
out of downward price movements since short selling is forbidden). On the other hand,
in the unconstrained scenario the investor can use downside information to create profit,
which in turn generates a similar cost-information profile to upside information. It should
be added that these characteristic behaviours are invariant under the overall scaling of the
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initial wealth and the asset prices.
The results revealed here correspond to, at least to some extent, situations one might en-
counter in real-life contexts, even though the model setup is quite simple. In particular, it is
interesting to draw attention, in the case where short selling is not allowed, to the fairly uni-
versal observation that (based on our model setup) when the expected loss of the investor
amounts to approximately 100% of the initial wealth, investors are willing to opt out of any
risky investment by spending the total initial wealth to purchase that information, so as to
prevent the possibility of loss beyond the initial wealth.
Finally, we conclude this section by remarking that the existence of information asymme-
tries is not only fundamental to modern microeconomic theory [41] but also constitutes
the basis for the existence of information providers, the roles of which are becoming in-
creasingly more important in modern society (internet search engines, recommendations,
etc.). Our main objective here has been to demonstrate in which way valuable information
can be priced in a rational manner. Although the models used here to illustrate our pricing
theory are simple, they nevertheless provide a useful conceptual guideline for evaluating
information in a variety of contexts.
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Conclusion
In this thesis, we have considered a variety of mathematical aspects of the role of infor-
mational inhomogeneities in financial markets. In particular, we have identified one of the
likely sources for the stochasticity of asset-price volatilities as arising from uncertainties
in information flow rates. We have been able to obtain closed-form expressions for asset
price processes and associated derivative prices in the simplest modelling setups—in a con-
text which is nevertheless sufficiently rich to be enable a fit to a wide range of volatility
surfaces.
We have also addressed the issue of the assignment of a value or price to a given piece of
information. Since there is no liquid market for information per se, we have in the present
work adopted a utility indifference argument as a reasonable starting point to tackle this
problem. Our point of departure, however, is to use the a posteriori measure, rather than
the a priori measure used in the literature for this purpose, in the determination of the fair
price of information. As a result, we have been able to obtain quality-dependent valuation
formulae for information.
The problem of information valuation has been analysed in this thesis in the context of a
financial market in which an information provider has access to a source of noisy or im-
perfect information concerning future returns, a source that is in particular adapted to a
filtration larger than that accessible to general market participants. That this kind of setup
is indeed reasonably realistic has been argued and reported in recent empirical studies—as
described, for example, in [12] and [8]. The problem of information valuation is, never-
theless, not confined exclusively to financial markets as such. The “value” of an internet
search engine, for instance, lies precisely in its ability to consistently provide information
that users do not already have and do not otherwise have ready access to. Internet retailers
likewise provide information in the form of recommendations and targeted advertisements,
which in turn also lead to profits. It would be of interest to extend and apply our theory in
broader settings such as these, since in the future the role of the value of information will
undoubtedly be an issue of increasing importance.
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Appendix A
Risk Neutral Measure for the Cost of
Information
A.1 Presence of arbitrage in the Grossman-Stiglitz formula
The purpose of this section is to demonstrate, by using a somewhat extreme example, that
according to the Grossman-Stiglitz formula for the cost of information it is possible to
start with zero initial wealth such that with positive probability one can gain infinite return.
Using the arguments presented in the paper by Grossman and Stiglitz [28], one finds that
the terminal wealth of an investor with zero initial wealth is given by
W ∗1 = −c∗δ−1 + ϕ∗(s1 − sˉ0),
where we recall that ϕ∗ is the a posteriori optimal strategy. If this quantity has finite
expectation under P, then clearly under any equivalent measure it will also have finite
expectation. In what follows, however, we show that the P-expectation of W ∗1 does not
exist, i.e. it is infinity.
First we note that the posterior probability of s1, πξ can take the following values:
π0 = 1 with probability pq
π1 =
p(1− q)
p(1− q) + q(1− p) with probability p(1− q) + (1− p)q
π2 = 0 with probability (1− p)(1− q).
It is straightforward to show from (4.8) that the optimised strategy ϕ∗ξ of the informed
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investor takes the following values:
ϕ∗0 = −∞ (A.1)
ϕ∗1 =
1
α
ln
[
q(1− p)(1− sˉ0)
p(1− q)sˉ0
]
(A.2)
ϕ∗2 = +∞. (A.3)
Therefore, we have the triplet (πξ, s1, ϕ∗) of random variables that can take the following
values with the specified joint probability:
(πξ, s1, ϕ
∗) =

(π0, 0, ϕ
∗
0) with probability pq
(π1, 0, ϕ
∗
1) with probability p(1− q)
(π1, 1, ϕ
∗
1) with probability q(1− p)
(π2, 1, ϕ
∗
2) with probability (1− p)(1− q).
This gives
E[ϕ∗(s1 − sˉ0)] = pq[−sˉ0ϕ∗0] + (p− pq)[−sˉ0ϕ∗1]
(q − qp)[(1− sˉ0)ϕ∗1] + (1− p− q + pq)[(1− sˉ0)ϕ∗2]
= ϕ∗0[−pqsˉ0] + ϕ∗1[sˉ0(2pq − q − p) + pq + q]
ϕ∗2[(1− sˉ0)(1− q)(1− p)].
Using equations (A.1) to (A.3) we see that the right side is infinity, hence E[W ∗1 ] = ∞. This
means that there exists no risk-neutral measure such that W ∗1 has vanishing expectation
value.
A.2 Finiteness of the terminal cost in discrete setting
Our objective here is to demonstrate, in the example just considered, that, in contrast to
the Grossman-Stiglitz formula, according to our pricing formula the P-expectation of the
terminal wealth W ∗1 is finite, and hence admits the possibility of the existence of the risk-
neutral measure. In our case, the cost c∗ is itself a random variable dependent on ξ. Hence
the expected terminal wealth is
E[W ∗1 ] = −E[c∗]δ−1 + E[ϕ∗(s1 − sˉ0)].
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For the case with a discrete random variable s1 ∈ {0, 1} with probabilities {p, 1 − p}, we
have already established that E[ϕ∗(s1 − sˉ0)] = ∞, and this leads to the conclusion that the
Grossman-Stiglitz model of information cost is not free of arbitrage. Our attention is now
on the expectation
E[c∗]δ−1 =
1
α
E
[
ln
πξe
αsˉ0φ∗ + (1− πξ)eα(sˉ0−1)φ∗
πξe
αsˉ0ϕ∗ξ + (1− πξ)eα(sˉ0−1)ϕ∗ξ
]
.
We have the following relations:
0 ≤ sˉ0 ≤ 1, ϕ∗ξ =
1
α
ln
[
(1− πξ)(1− sˉ0)
πξsˉ0
]
.
It follows that
ϕ∗0 = −∞
ϕ∗1 =
1
α
ln
[
q(1− p)(1− sˉ0)
p(1− q)sˉ0
]
ϕ∗2 = ∞,
and that
π0 = 1 (A.4)
π1 =
p(1− q)
p(1− q) + q(1− p) (A.5)
π2 = 0. (A.6)
As before, we have
P(ξ = 0) = pq,
P(ξ = 1) = p(1− q) + (1− p)q, and
P(ξ = 2) = (1− p)(1− q).
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Hence,
E[c∗]α = pq ln
[
π0e
αsˉ0φ∗ + (1− π0)eα(sˉ0−1)φ∗
π0eαsˉ0ϕ
∗
0 + (1− π0)eα(sˉ0−1)ϕ∗0
]
+ (p(1− q) + q(1− p)) ln
[
π1e
αsˉ0φ∗ + (1− π1)eα(sˉ0−1)φ∗
π1eαsˉ0ϕ
∗
1 + (1− π1)eα(sˉ0−1)ϕ∗1
]
+ (1− p)(1− q) ln
[
π2e
αsˉ0φ∗ + (1− π2)eα(sˉ0−1)φ∗
π2eαsˉ0ϕ
∗
2 + (1− π2)eα(sˉ0−1)ϕ∗2
]
,
and using the equalities for π0, π2 (A.4) and (A.6) we get
E[c∗]α = pqαsˉ0(φ∗ − ϕ∗0) (A.7)
+(p(1− q) + q(1− p)) ln
[
π1e
αsˉ0φ∗ + (1− π1)eα(sˉ0−1)φ∗
π1eαsˉ0ϕ
∗
1 + (1− π1)eα(sˉ0−1)ϕ∗1
]
(A.8)
+(1− p)(1− q)α(sˉ0 − 1)(φ∗ − ϕ∗2). (A.9)
Let us denote the second term in the right side of (A.9) by A(ϕ∗1), which is a finite quantity.
We now have
E[W ∗1 ] = −E[c∗]δ−1 + E[ϕ∗(s1 − sˉ0)]
= −pqsˉ0(φ∗ − ϕ∗0)− A(ϕ∗1)/α− (1− p)(1− q)(sˉ0 − 1)(φ∗ − ϕ∗2)
−pqsˉ0ϕ∗0 + B(ϕ∗1)− (1− p)(1− q)(sˉ0 − 1)ϕ∗2
= B(ϕ∗1)− A(ϕ∗1)/α + φ∗((1− p)(1− q)(1− sˉ0)− pqsˉ0),
where B(ϕ∗1) = ϕ∗1[sˉ0(2pq − p − q) + q − pq] is also finite. It follows that there exists at
least one risk-neutral measure such that the wealth “process” W is a martingale.
To look for a risk neutral measure μ such that Eμ[W ∗1 ] = 0 let us start from the most
elementary case. Let su and sd denote the upper and lower values of the discrete random
variable s1:
μsd + (1− μ)su = sˉ0.
Immediately, we can derive the risk-neutral measure for this simple case:
μ =
sˉ0 − su
sd − su .
This means s1 is a μ−martingale. Hence in the simplest case when we do not have an extra
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information and W0 = 0:
Eμ[W ∗1 ] = Eμ[ϕ∗(s1 − sˉ0)]
= 0.
Now, if we were given extra information as set out previously with a cost c, the risk neutral
measure ν is the set of probabilities {ri}i=1,...,4 such that the following relation must hold:
Eν [W ∗1,c] = 0
We now perform explicit calculations
Eν [W ∗1,c] = −Eν [c∗]δ−1 + Eν [ϕ∗(s1 − sˉ0)]
= Eν
ln(eα(s1−sˉ0)ϕ∗)1/α − ln(πξeαsˉ0φ∗ + (1− πξ)eα(sˉ0−1)φ∗
πξe
αsˉ0ϕ∗ξ + (1− πξ)eα(sˉ0−1)ϕ∗ξ
)1/α
=
1
α
Eν
[
ln
(
πξe
αs1ϕ∗ + (1− πξ)eα(s1−1)ϕ∗
πξ + (1− πξ)e−α(s1−1)φ∗
)]
− sˉ0φ∗
=
1
α
(
r1 ln[1] + r4 ln[e
αφ∗ ] + r2 ln
[
π1 + (1− π1)e−αϕ∗1
π1 + (1− π1)e−αφ∗
]
+ r3 ln
[
π1e
αϕ∗1 + (1− π1)
π1 + (1− π1)e−αφ∗
]
− αsˉ0φ∗
)
,
where {ri} represents the joint probabilities of the random variables ξ and s1:
(πξ, s1, ϕ
∗) =

(π0, 0, ϕ
∗
0) with probability r1
(π1, 0, ϕ
∗
1) with probability r2
(π1, 1, ϕ
∗
1) with probability r3
(π2, 1, ϕ
∗
2) with probability r4.
A.2 Finiteness of the terminal cost in discrete setting 96
Continuing with the calculation by substituting values for π1, ϕ∗1 and φ∗ we have
αEν [W ∗1,c] = (r4 − sˉ0) ln
(1− p)(1− sˉ0)
psˉ0
+ r2 ln
p(1− q) + p(1− q) sˉ0
1−sˉ0
p(1− q) + pq sˉ0
1−sˉ0
+r3 ln
q(1− p)1−sˉ0
sˉ0
+ q(1− p)
p(1− q) + pq sˉ0
1−sˉ0
= ln
[(
(1− p)(1− sˉ0)
psˉ0
)(r4−sˉ0)
×
(
1− q
1− sˉ0
1
(1− q) + q sˉ0
1−sˉ0
)r2 (
q(1− p)
psˉ0
1
(1− q) + q sˉ0
1−sˉ0
)r3]
.
As stated above, we require this expression to vanish for a suitable choice of {ri}. Expo-
nentiating, the problem reduces to finding a solution that satisfies the following relation:
(
(1− p)(1− sˉ0)
psˉ0
)(r4−sˉ0)( 1− q
1− sˉ0
1
(1− q) + q sˉ0
1−sˉ0
)r2
×
(
q(1− p)
psˉ0
1
(1− q) + q sˉ0
1−sˉ0
)r3
= 1.
This is equivalent to
(
(1− p)
psˉ0
)(r4+r3−sˉ0)( 1
(1− q) + q sˉ0
1−sˉ0
)(r2+r3)
×(1− sˉ0)(r4−r2−sˉ0) ∙ (1− q)r2 ∙ qr3 = 1. (A.10)
The factors cannot be further reduced. To demonstrate the existence of the solution, we
simply construct one such that all exponents vanish:
r2 = r3 = 0,
which implies
r4 = sˉ0.
Using r1 + r4 = 1 we have
r1 = 1− sˉ0.
Hence the risk-neutral measure ν is given by the probabilities {ri} as defined.
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A.3 Gaussian case
In this section we demonstrate a similar no arbitrage property in our information cost model
for the case when the terminal value of the risky asset is Gaussian distributed. From equa-
tion (4.15) the augmented utility indifference information cost is given by
c∗ =
1
2
αδσ2ξ (φ
∗ − ϕ∗)2,
where the a prior and a posterior trading strategies are, respectively,
φ∗ =
μ− sˉ0
ασ2
,
and
ϕ∗ =
μξ − sˉ0
ασ2ξ
.
We want to work out
cˉ =
∫ ∞
−∞
c∗(ξ)dP(ξ) ≡ Eξ[c∗]. (A.11)
and show that this indeed is finite, hence without arbitrage. This reduces to working out
Eξ[c∗] =
1
2
αδσ2ξ ∙ Eξ
[
(φ∗ − ϕ∗)2] . (A.12)
Since φ is the a prior strategy, it does not depend on the extra information ξ. The main
problem is to work out Eξ[ϕ∗]. As before, ξ = ST +², where both (ST , ²) Gaussian random
variables as defined in chapter 4, is a Gaussian random variable ξ ∼ N(μ, σ2 + σ2² ). Also
from chapter 4, we have
μξ =
μσ2² + ξσ
2
σ2² + σ
2
,
therefore, taking the conditional expectation we get
Eξ[μξ] =
μσ2² + μσ
2
σ2² + σ
2
= μ,
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where Eξ denotes the expectation taken under the P(ξ) measure. Furthermore,
Eξ[μ2ξ ] = E
[
(μσ2² + ξσ
2)2
(σ2² + σ
2)2
]
= E
[
ξ2σ4 + μ2σ4² + 2μξσ
2σ2²
(σ2² + σ
2)2
]
=
(σ2 + σ2² + μ
2)σ4 + μ2σ4² + 2μ
2σ2σ2²
(σ2² + σ
2)2
=
σ4(σ2 + σ2² ) + μ
2(σ2² + σ
2)2
(σ2² + σ
2)2
=
σ4
σ2 + σ2²
+ μ2.
Consequently, we deduce that
Varξ[μξ] =
σ4
σ2 + σ2²
.
Therefore, the a posterior expectation of the informed strategy is given by
Eξ[ϕ∗] =
Eξ[μξ]− sˉ0
ασ2ξ
=
μ− sˉ0
ασ2ξ
.
And the conditional expectation of the squared of the strategy is
Eξ[(ϕ∗)2] = E∗
[
(μξ − sˉ0)2
α2σ4ξ
]
=
E∗[μ2ξ ] + sˉ20 − 2sˉ0E∗[μξ]
α2σ4ξ
=
σ4
σ2+σ2²
+ μ2 + sˉ20 − 2sˉ0μ
α2σ4ξ
=
1
α2
(
σ2 + σ2²
σ4²
+
(μ− sˉ0)2
σ4ξ
)
.
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We are now in position to solve equation (A.12)
Eξ[c∗] =
1
2
αδσ2ξ ∙ Eξ
[
(φ− ϕ)2]
=
1
2
αδσ2ξ ∙
(
φ2 + Eξ[ϕ2]− 2φEξ[ϕ])
=
1
2α
δσ2ξ ∙
(
(μ− sˉ0)2
σ4
+
σ2 + σ2²
σ4²
+
(μ− sˉ0)2
σ4ξ
− 2(μ− sˉ0)
ασ2
(μ− sˉ0)
ασ2ξ
)
=
1
2α
δσ2ξ ∙
(
(μ− sˉ0)2( 1
σ2
− 1
σ2ξ
)2 +
σ2
σ2ξσ
2
²
)
.
The average cost is a constant depending only on ξ. One can similarly, as in the discrete
case, find a risk-neutral distribution such that cˉ = 0. Hence this suggests that there exists a
risk neutral measure and therefore our information cost model is without arbitrage.
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Appendix B
Filtration Enlargement
In the following, we shall state existing results on martingale theory and filtration enlarge-
ment. For detailed proofs we refer the reader to [3, 5, 21, 35, 46].
Let S = ({St}0≤t≤T ) be a vector of locally bounded semi-martingales on the probability
space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration F = {Ft}0≤t≤T satisfying the usual conditions1
and T = [0, T ], 0 ≤ T < ∞. The probability measure P is understood to be the real
measure, and the filtration {Ft} is generated by the ca`dla`g process S.
Definition B.0.1. A stochastic process X is said to be ca`dla`g if for each ω ∈ Ω, the path
X(ω) is right-continuous and admits a left limit.
Definition B.0.2 (Semimartingale). A semimartingale is a ca`dla`g adapted process X hav-
ing a decomposition in the form:
X = X0 + M + A
where M is a ca`dla`g local martingale, and A is a adapted process with finite variation.
Definition B.0.3. The filtration G = {Gt}t∈[0,T ] is called the initially enlarged filtration of
F, and is defined by
Gt := Ft ∨ G, t ∈ [0, T ]
where G = σ(ξ) ∈ F is generated by some random variable ξ taking values in a general
measurable space (X,X ). Without loss of generality, we choose (X,X ) := (Ω,G).
1Right continuous (Ft+ =
⋂
s≥t Fs = Ft) and complete (F0 contains the negligible sets of FTˉ ).
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We have now two filtrations, a background filtration F which is generated by the semi-
martingale S, and an initially enlarged filtration G given by some extra information ξ. We
want to draw relations between the two filtrations, in particular, the semimartingale prop-
erty relationship.
Theorem B.0.4 (Jacod). Suppose the following condition is satisfied: For every t, a regular
conditional distribution of G given Ft exists and is P-almost surely equivalent to the law of
G, i.e. for all B ∈ X
P[G ∈ B|Ft](w) ∼ P[G ∈ B], for P− almost anywhere ω ∈ Ω.
Then every (P,F)-semimartingale remains a (P,G)-semimartingale on the interval [0, T ].
Consequently, we need not to distinguish between semimartingale adapted to F andG. The
condition in the previous theorem implies the existence of an X ⊗Ft-measurable function
p : X × Ω → (0,∞) such that for P -almost any ω
P[G ∈ B|Ft](ω) =
∫
B
p(x, ω)P[G ∈ dx]. (B.1)
We denote pG(ω) := p(G(ω), ω) and px(ω) := p(x, ω) for ω ∈ Ω. Note that each px is
Ft-measurable and pG is Gt-measurable.
Amendinger et al. [3] show that this condition is equivalent to the following:
Condition B.0.5 (Amendinger et al. [3]). There exists a probability measure R ∼ P such
that Ft and G are R-independent.
TheRmeasure is called the decoupling measure and ensures the existence of the martingale
preserving probability measure. We shall assume such measure exist.
Lemma B.0.6 (Amendinger et al. [3]). Suppose condition B.0.5 is satisfied. Then G
satisfies under P the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness.
B.1 Martingale preserving probability measure
Following the setting in [3], an immediate consequence of the decoupling measure is that
we can introduce separate measures for different filtrations:
Lemma B.1.1 (Amendinger et al. [3]). Let P1 and P2 be probability measures on Ft and
G respectively which are both equivalent to P . If condition B.0.5 holds, there is a unique
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probability measure μ ∼ P on Ft ∨ G such that μ = P1 on Ft, μ = P2 on G, and Ft and G
are μ-independent. This is denoted by Pdec(P1, P2) := μ.
Proof. For fixed t, Ft and G are R− independent. Define
dμ
dR
=
dP1
dR
∣∣∣∣
Ft
dP2
dR
∣∣∣∣
G
.
Then Eμ[1A1B] = P1[A]P2[B] for A ∈ Ft and B ∈ G, using the R-independence of Ft
and G.
Definition B.1.2. We say Q is a risk neutral measure of S if Q ∈Me(S), where
Me(S) = {Q v P on (Ω,FT ) : discounted price of S is a Q-local martingale}, (B.2)
and the associated Radon-Nikodym density is denoted by
ZT =
dQ
dP
.
For all t ∈ [0, T ], the restriction of Q to Ft is absolutely continuous with respect to the
restriction of P to Ft. Hence the process {Zt}t∈[0,t] is a positive martingale.
Following from lemma B.1.1, we give a specific name for the decoupling measure that
concerns with the risk neutral measure
Definition B.1.3 (Amendinger et al. [3]). Let Q v P and let Q|Ft and P|G denote the
restrictions on Ft and G respectively. The measure Q˜ := Pdec(Q|Ft ,P|G) is called the
martingale preserving probability measure (corresponding to Q).
The measure Q˜ is unique on Ft∨G and possesses the properties described in lemma B.1.1.
Specifically, (Q,F)-martingale remains (Q˜,F)-martingale. Furthermore, the martingale
property is preserved under Q˜ in G. Summarizing all the useful ingredients:
Corollary B.1.4 (Amendinger et al. [3]). Suppose condition B.0.5 is satisfied. Then,
1. We have Me(S,Q,F) = Me(S, Q˜,F) ⊆ Me(S, Q˜,G) and every semimartingale
with respect to (Q,F) is also a semimartingale with respect to (Q,G).
2. Any F-adapted process L has the same distribution under Q˜ and Q. If L has in
addition (Q,F) independent increments, i.e. Lt − Ls is Q-independent of Fs for
time 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T , then L has also (Q˜.G)-independent increments, and the
semimartingale characteristics of L are the same for (Q,F) and (Q˜,G).
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3. Let S be a multidimensional (P.F)-semimartingale. Then an F-predictable process
H is S-integrable with respect to F if and only if H is S-integrable with respect to
G, and the stochastic integrals of H with respect to S coincide for both filtration, i.e.∫
T
HdSF =
∫
T
HdSG.
Proposition B.1.5 (Amendinger et al. [3]). If the condition in theorem B.0.4 is satisfied
then Q˜ = Pdec(Q,P) exists and is given by
dQ˜
dP
=
ZT
pG
. (B.3)
i.e. for A ∈ Ft and B ∈ X
Q˜[A ∩ {G ∈ B}] = Q˜[A]Q˜[{G ∈ B}] = Q[A]P[G ∈ B]
The proof can be found in [3, 26]. The idea is that ZT /pG is like ZT a P-density, strictly
positive. There exists a measure μ ∼ P defined by dμ := (ZT /pG)dP = (1/pG)dQ,
together with the decoupling property we get
μ[A ∩ {G ∈ B}] = E
[
ZT
pG
∙ 1{A ∩G ∈ B}
]
= EQ
[
1AEQ
[
1G∈B
1
pG
∣∣∣∣Ft]]
=
∫
A
EQ
[
1G∈B
1
pG
∣∣∣∣Ft] (ω)Q(dω). (B.4)
By equation (B.1) we have
EQ
[
1G∈B
1
pG
∣∣∣∣Ft] = ∫
B
1
p(x, ω)
p(x, ω)P [G ∈ dx] = P[G ∈ B]
Hence, equation (B.4) becomes
μ[A ∩ {G ∈ B}] = Q[A]P[G ∈ B].
And we take μ = Q˜ to represent such measure.
The martingale preserving measure allows us to determine a measure on the enlarged fil-
tration G and hence standard theories of utility maximisation can be applied.
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B.2 Strong predictable representation property
The following proposition from [3] shows that under condition B.0.5 the martingale rep-
resentation property of S with respect to the filtration F and measure Q implies the same
property with respect to the enlarged filtrationG and the corresponding martingale preserv-
ing measure Q˜.
Proposition B.2.1 (Amendinger et al. [3]). Suppose the general filtration H = (Ht)t∈T
satisfies the usual conditions and there is a probability measure QH ∼ P such that S ∈
Me(S,QH,H). Denote
ΓH :=
{
Q ∼ QH
∣∣∣∣ dQdQH isHT -measurable, Q = QH onH0, S ∈Me(Q,H)
}
.
Then the following statements are equivalent:
1. ΓH = {QH}.
2. The setMe(S,QH,H) of local (QH,H)-martingales is equal to the set{
θ ∙ S| θ is S-integrable with respect to (QH,H) in the sense of local martingales} .(B.5)
of stochastic integrals with respects to S.
We say that S has the strong predictable representation property (P.R.P) with respect to
(QH,H) if one of these statements is valid.
Theorem B.2.2 (Amendinger et al. [3]). Suppose condition B.0.5 is satisfied and S has
the strong predictable representation property with respect to (QF,F) for some QF ∼ P.
Let QG = Q˜F denote the martingale preserving probability measure corresponding to QF.
Then S has the strong predictable representation property with respect to (QG,G). For
short ΓF = {QF} implies ΓG = {QG}, or
(QF,F)-P.R.P. implies (Q˜F,G)-P.R.P. (B.6)
The argument proves that the uniqueness of the equivalent F-martingale measure for S
implies the uniqueness of the equivalent G-martingale measure in the sense of Proposition
B.2.1.
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Appendix C
Utility Optimisation in Incomplete
Market via Convex Duality
C.1 No arbitrage condition
The notion of an incomplete market implies that there is no unique risk-neutral measure
selected by the market as such. Let us define the set of equivalent martingale measures
Me(S) to be the set of equivalent measures that makes S a local martingale:
Me(S) = {Q v P on (Ω,FT ) : discounted price of S is a Q-local martingale}. (C.1)
The existence of an equivalent local martingale measure is a sufficient and necessary con-
dition for no arbitrage. We assume
Me(S) 6= ∅. (C.2)
The idea is that there exists at least one risk- neutral measure so that the asset price is
a martingale. For any Q ∈ Me(S) and H ∈ A(S), the admissible set of controls, the
lower-bounded integral
∫
αdS (bounded by −w) is a local martingale under Q, thus a
supermartingale. i.e.
EQ[WT ] =EQ[
∫ T
0
HudSu] ≤ 0.
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Therefore equation (C.2) implies
@ H ∈ A(S),
∫ T
0
HtdSt ≥ 0 a.s. and P
[∫ T
0
HtdSt > 0
]
> 0.
In other words, we cannot find an admissible portfolio strategy, which allows us, starting
from a null capital, to reach almost surely at T a nonnegative wealth, with a non-zero
probability of being strictly positive.
In the context of pricing kernel [14], this is equivalent to assuming the existence of a pricing
kernel πt s.t.
Mt = πtSt
is a martingale. This implies there exists a Radon-Nikodym derivative ρt = Ptπt = dQdP , Pt
a riskless bank account, such that we have EQ[P−1t St] a martingale.
C.2 Dual formulation
Define the conjugate function of U(x) to be the Fenchel-Legendre transform:
V (y) := sup
x∈R+
[U(x)− xy], y > 0.
We restrict dom(V) = {y > 0 : V(y) < ∞}. Note that the optimisation is now performed
over a set of variables y instead of set of processes H . The conjugate function V is de-
creasing, differentiable with respect to y, strictly convex on (0,∞) with Uˆ(0) = U(∞) and
Uˆ ′ = −(U ′)−1 = −I .
We define I : (0,∞) → (0,∞) the inverse function of U ′ on (0,∞)
I = (U ′)−1,
which is strictly decreasing, and satisfies I(0) = ∞ and I(∞) = 0.
Differentiating V with respect to y, we find the maximum is attained at x∗ = I(y) > 0 i.e.
V (y) = U(I(y))− yI(y), y > 0
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and we have the conjugate relation
U(x) = inf
y>0
[V (y) + xy], x > 0
with an infimum attained at y∗ = U ′(x).
For any Q ∈Me define the change of measure martingale Z = (Zt)0≤t≤T by
Zt :=
dQ
dP
∣∣∣∣
Ft
.
The Radon-Nikodym derivative characterizes the the measure Q ∼ P. Define the dual
value function v(y) by
v(y) := inf
Q∈Me
EV (yZT ). (C.3)
We shall assume that this function is finite valued and that the solution of the primal prob-
lem can be obtained by solving the dual problem.
We assume there exists an unique dual optimiser attaining the infimum (C.3). Denote the
dual optimiser by Z∗T , the optimal terminal wealth by X∗T and the optimal trading strategy
by H∗T .
Since we have S a Q-local-martingale bounded below, it is therefore a Q-supermartingale.
We emphasize the following characteristic for XT :
E[ZT XT ] ≤ x, ∀ZT ∈Me.
Hence
E[U(XT )] ≤ E[V (yZT ) + yZT XT ]
≤ E[V (yZT )] + xy
Then ∀x > 0
u(x) = sup
XT∈X+T
E[U(XT )] ≤ inf
y>0,ZT∈Me
{E[V (yZT )] + xy} = inf
y>0
[v(y) + xy]. (C.4)
Hence we have the conjugate relationship:
v(y) = sup
x∈R+
[u(x)− xy], y > 0.
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The solution to the primal maximize problem u(x) is
X∗T = I(y
∗Z∗T ) i.e. U
′(X∗T ) = y
∗Z∗T (C.5)
where yˆ > 0 is the solution to
E[Z∗T I(yZ∗T )] = EQ
∗
[I(yZ∗T )] = x.
And the following properties holds true:
u′(x) = EU ′(X∗T ), v′(y) = EV ′ (yZ∗T ) .
Proposition C.2.1 (Amendinger et al. [3]). Suppose the no-arbitrage condition is satisfied
and there exists anH0-measurable random variable yH(x) : Ω → (0,∞) with
EH[I(yHZH∗T )|H0] = x
where H = (Ht)t∈T ∈ {F,G} and EH[∙] denotes the risk-neutral filtration in H, and such
that the process X∗Ht = EH[I(yHZH∗T )|Ht], t ∈ [0, T ] satisfies U−(X∗HT ) ∈ L1(P ). Then
X∗HT is the solution to the optimisation problem (4.19).
C.3 Exponential utility optimisation
Having acquired all the tools, we are in position to solve the optimisation problem (4.19).
We have for the utility function of the form, U(x) = − exp(−αx). Consider a stock price
process follows a dynamics as described by equation (4.17), and define the progressively
measurable process valued in R:
λt = σt(σtσ
T
t )
−1(μt − rt1), 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
We assume that λt is bounded. The process λt is the risk-adjusted return of the asset,
commonly known as the Sharpe ratio.
Under the Brownian filtration framework, we can give explicit description for the set of
martingale probability measuresMe(S). Let us consider the set
K(σ) = {ν ∈ L2loc(W ) : σν = 0, on [0, T ]× Ω, dt⊗ dP a.e.}.
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In words, the set K(σ) contains Gaussian distributed random variables such that they are
orthogonal to the volatility of the stock price process, almost everywhere. And ν chosen
such that it is orthogonal to λ and satisfies the Novikov condition, i.e.
E
[
exp
(
1
2
∫ T
0
|λt|2 + |νt|2dt
)]
< ∞.
For any ν ∈ K(σ), the Radon Nikodym derivative is given by
Zνt = exp
(
−
∫ t
0
(λu + νu)dWu − 1
2
∫ t
0
|λu + νu|2du
)
, 0 ≤ t ≤ T.
By Girsanov’s theorem, the process
W νt = Wt +
∫ t
0
(λu + νu)du
is a Brownian motion under Q, where Q ∼ P with martingale density process Zνt . The
asset process under the Q dynamics
dSt = St (μtdt + σtdWt)
= Strtdt + StσtdW
ν
therefore the discounted price takes the following form:
d
(
Sˉt
)
= Sˉt[(μt − rt)dt + σtdW ]
= SˉtσtdW
ν (C.6)
is a Q-supermartingale.
We can derive some dual functions that will be useful for our calculation. Differentiating
the utility function in equation (4.18) and then take the functional inverse we get
I(y) = (U ′(y))−1 = − 1
α
ln
y
α
.
The conjugate function with the exponential utility is therefore
V (y) = U(I(y))− yI(y) = y
α
(
ln
y
α
− 1
)
.
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The dual optimiser can be obtained by minimising the dual value function (C.3):
E[V (yZνT )] = E
[
yZνT
α
(
ln
yZνT
α
− 1
)]
= EQ
[
V (y) +
y
α
(
−
∫
λ + νdWt − 1
2
∫
|λ + ν|2dt
)]
= EQ
[
V (y) +
y
α
(
−
∫
λ + νdW νt +
1
2
∫
|λ + ν|2dt
)]
= EQ
[
V (y) +
y
2α
∫
|λ + ν|2dt
]
.
The last line is due to that W ν is a Q-Brownian motion. The solution to the dual optimi-
sation problem v(y) is attained for ν = 0, in particular independent of y. Denote the dual
optimiser by Z0T . Equation (C.5) implies that
X∗t = E[X∗T |Ft] = E
[
Z0T I(yZ
0
T )|Ft
]
= EQ
[
− 1
α
ln
yZ0T
α
∣∣∣∣Ft]
= EQ
[
1
α
(
ln
α
y
+
∫ T
0
λtdWt +
1
2
∫ T
0
|λt|2dt
)∣∣∣∣Ft]
=
1
α
(
ln
α
y
+
∫ t
0
λudW
0
u −
1
2
∫ T
0
|λt|2dt
)
,
where W 0t is a Brownian motion under the optimal measure Q. The dual variable is deter-
mined by the initial condition X0 = x, hence
x =
1
α
(
ln
α
y
− 1
2
∫ T
0
|λt|2dt
)
.
We get that the dynamic of the portfolio is given by
dX∗t = α
−1λtdW 0t .
Comparing with the definition of the portfolio process
dXt = HtdSˉt = HtσtSˉtdW
0
t ,
we find the optimal asset allocation strategy
H∗t Sˉt =
1
α
σt(σtσ
T
t )
−1λt =
1
α
σt(σtσ
T
t )
−1σt(σtσTt )
−1(μt − rt1).
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We remark that the result is identical to the one period setting as shown in Grossman and
Stiglitz [28] if μt represents the return over the risk free level. The allocation strategy H∗ is
risk-adjusted, which means an asset with large variance will be penalized and consequently
we should hold less of it. The asset price St acts as a normalising factor, so we will spend
the same proportion of wealth if two stocks have different prices but same drift and volatil-
ity. In this case, we are allowed to short selling, because we can a negative drift. To impose
the condition of no short selling, we need to define the convex cone for the dual variable
y, and solve the dual problem for y = y(v) by applying the HJB equation. We will not go
into detail of this in this section.
We can solve the primal problem (4.19) through the bidual relationship. Recall the dual
value function (C.3)
v(y) = inf
Q∈M
E[V (yZνT )]
= inf
Q∈M
E
[
yZνT
α
(
ln
yZνT
α
− 1
)]
= V (y) +
y
α
inf
Q∈M
E[ZνT ln ZνT ]
Define the relative entropy between measures Q and P:
H(Q,P) = E
[
dQ
dP
ln
dQ
dP
]
,
andQE = arg minQ∈MH(Q,P) the minimal entropy measure, where the minimal measure
Q|FT is described by the change of measure martingale Z0T . Therefore,
v(y) = V (y) +
y
α
H(QE,P).
The conjugate relation (C.4) gives
u(x) = inf
y∈R+
[
V (y) +
y
α
H(QE,P) + xy
]
.
The infimum of the dual variable y∗ is attained at
y∗ = α exp
(−αx−H(QE,P)) .
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Alternatively, in a non-diffusive manner, proposition C.2.1 yields
X∗t = EQ[I(y∗Z0T )|Ft]
= EQ
[
− 1
α
ln
[
Z0T ∙ exp(−αx−H(QE,P))
]∣∣∣∣Ft]
= EQ
[
− 1
α
(
ln
[
Z0T
]
+ ln
[
exp(−αx−H(QE,P))])∣∣∣∣Ft]
= x +
1
α
(H(QE,P)− EQ[ln Z0T |Ft]) .
Using the identity:
exp(EQ[ln Z0T |FT ]) = Z0T ,
the primal value function is given by
u(x) = E[U(X∗T )]
= E[Z0T exp(−αx−H(QE,P))]
= − exp (−αx−H(QE,P)) .
This gives us the value function of the portfolio optimisation problem for the uninform
investor. Indeed one could explicitly write out the Entropy function:
H(QE,P) = 1
2
∫ T
0
|λt|2dt.
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